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INTRODUCTION
Public litigation is being privatized as public entities turn to private actors to
perform, and sometimes to pay for, litigation on behalf of the state and federal
governments. Consider the following examples:
●
●

●
●

●

The U.S. Department of Justice hires David Boies to lead antitrust
litigation against the Microsoft Corporation.1
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) hires two private
law firms to represent it in litigation against large banks concerning
toxic mortgage securities. One of those firms boasts “long-standing and
continuous representation of the NCUA in various matters.”2
Multiple states hire private attorneys to represent them in litigation
against tobacco companies in exchange for a portion of the proceeds.3
After the state attorney general refuses to sue, the Nevada governor
creates a “Constitution Defense Fund,” supported by private donations,
to pay for costs associated with prosecuting the state’s challenge to the
Affordable Care Act (ACA).4 Other states’ challenges to the ACA are
handled, in part, by a private firm and financed by a private lobbying
group.5
Private citizens, many from out of state, bankroll a special prosecutor’s
efforts to target topless bars in Memphis.6

1. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Public Lives; Readying the Slingshot for a Modern Goliath, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/12/nyregion/public-lives-readying-the-slingshot-fora-modern-goliath.html.
2. James V. Grimaldi & Alicia Mundy, Nice Payday for ‘Toxic’ Work, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2012,
12:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203937004578076651157057278?mg⫽idwsj.
3. See Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the
Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (noting
that “the state tobacco litigation was precedent-setting in the scale and prominence of its use of
contingent fee lawyers”).
4. Gibbons Sets Up ‘Constitution Defense Fund’ to Fight Health Reform, LAS VEGAS SUN (Apr. 8,
2010, 4:04 PM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2010/apr/08/gibbons-sets-constitution-defense-fund-fighthealt/.
5. Charles Elmore, Lobbying Group Picks Up Costs of Florida’s Health-Care Legal Challenge, PALM
BEACH POST (Feb. 19, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/lobbying-group-picksup-costs-of-floridas-health-c/nLqFx/.
6. Lawrence Buser, Private Giving Tops $300,000 in War on Topless Clubs, COM. APPEAL (MEMPHIS,
TENN.), Sept. 15, 1997, at A1.
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Ben & Jerry’s ice cream company contributes $1 from every purchase at
certain locations to support the defense of Vermont’s law requiring
special labels for food containing genetically modified organisms. Ben
& Jerry’s recently committed to using non-GMO ingredients in its own
products.7

Though these examples are all of recent vintage, the privatization of government litigation is not new.8 Indeed, much of what appears as privatization today
would have been taken for granted as a historical matter. Before we had a
United States Department of Justice (DOJ), it was commonplace for private
lawyers to handle the federal government’s work.9 And private prosecutions
were once the norm in many jurisdictions.10 Over time, however, our system
“publicized” most litigation in the name of the government, shifting control
from private actors to salaried public servants.
We are now witnessing at least a partial shift back as privatization becomes
more prevalent, particularly at the state and local levels.11 The trend coincides
with a marked rise in the visibility and ambition of state attorneys general.12 As
government litigators aspire to do more, they are increasingly turning to private
resources—both human and financial—to support their efforts.
Privatization in the litigation context also coincides with broader trends
toward privatization more generally.13 At least since the 1980s, state and federal
7. Ben & Jerry’s Supports Vermont in GMO-Labeling Fight, NBC NEWS (June 16, 2014, 5:32 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ben-jerrys-supports-vermont-gmo-labeling-fight-n132571.
8. For example, South Carolina hired a prominent private lawyer to represent the state before the
Supreme Court in Briggs v. Elliot, a later companion case to Brown v. Board of Education. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 529–31 (rev. ed. 2004).
9. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal
Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 559 (2003) (explaining that one of the primary purposes behind
the creation of the DOJ was “to eliminate the reliance on private lawyers in litigation”).
10. See infra notes 227–38 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part I.B. This Article focuses on privatization of the government’s work as litigator. It
does not address privatization of the government’s adjudicative functions. On the latter question, see
Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. REV. 129, 165–76
(2015); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 1793 (2014); Judith Resnik, Opinion, Renting Judges for
Secret Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, at A19.
12. See Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys General as
Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1235–36 (2015) (detailing the growing responsibilities, activism, and
ambitions of state attorneys general).
13. The literature on privatization is vast and ever-expanding. For a small sampling, see JOHN D.
DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS (1989); GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); ELLIOTT D.
SCLAR, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION (2000); PAUL R.
VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2007); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367 (2003); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023 (2013); Symposium, Public
Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
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policymakers have embraced privatization as a way to cut costs and reduce the
size of government. In the United States, privatization typically involves enlisting private actors to perform, on the government’s behalf, functions that otherwise would be carried out by government employees.14 Less intuitively,
privatization also may entail a move from public to private financing for public
goods and services.15 Both types of privatization have been the subjects of
extensive debate. On the performance side, advocates argue that outsourcing
work to private firms is more efficient than relying on bloated government
bureaucracies staffed by overpaid and unmotivated civil servants.16 Critics
question whether privatization is cheaper in practice, and contend that any
efficiency gains come at an intolerable cost to democratic and programmatic
accountability.17 As for financing, privatization’s proponents argue that many
government services can and should be funded individually rather than collectively—that is, via user fees and the like rather than general taxes.18 User fees
allow governments to generate revenue while reducing taxes, and can send
useful signals about the value of the services in question while ensuring that
those who reap the benefits also absorb the costs.19 Critics worry that citizens
will be unwilling or unable to bear the expense of valuable government services, particularly when nonpayers can still enjoy many of the benefits.20

14. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1370 (describing the prevalent model of privatization in the
United States as “government use of private entities to implement government programs or to provide
services to others on the government’s behalf”).
15. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQUETTE L. REV. 449,
461–62 (1988) (discussing “direct dollar choices”).
16. See Michaels, supra note 13, at 1034 (“Rank-and-file government workers are viewed [by
privatization’s proponents] as receiving higher base pay and more generous benefits than their privatesector counterparts.” (footnote omitted)).
17. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 13, at 1, 4–5 (summarizing the major critiques of privatization).
Some critics have cast the accountability critique in constitutional terms, arguing that privatization
violates due process, the separation of powers, the Appointments Clause, or a freestanding “constitutional principle of accountability.” See Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting
Delegations to Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 511, 523–54 (2011) (describing the various
constitutional arguments and emphasizing accountability). Constitutional challenges have had little
success. See Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA
L. REV. 911, 919–20 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not invalidated a private delegation since the
New Deal era case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co. . . . .”).
18. See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795 (1987).
19. See id. at 814 (noting that user fees can “lessen burdens that otherwise would be borne by
taxpayers who derive little or no benefit from the service”); Milton Kafoglis, User Fees as a Regulatory
Tool, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: FEDERAL USER FEES, PROCEEDINGS OF A
SYMPOSIUM 13, 17 (Thomas D. Hopkins ed., 1988) [hereinafter ACUS SYMPOSIUM] (arguing that user
fees “generate incentives on the part of payees to monitor the efficiency of the operation of agencies”);
Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay for” Model of Local
Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 397–429 (2004) (describing local governments’ increasing reliance
on user fees and similar mechanisms to raise money while reducing or freezing taxes).
20. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 808 (cautioning against user fees for services that have
the qualities of public goods).
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Opponents also insist that some government goods and services are simply too
fundamental to ration according to citizens’ willingness and ability to pay.21
The privatization of public litigation warrants a place in these debates.
Privatizing government litigation promises many of the same benefits, and
threatens many of the same costs, as privatization in other contexts. In a sense,
the question whether to rely on private attorneys to perform the government’s
legal work presents the same “make or buy” dilemma that governments—and
private firms—regularly face. And the question whether private actors should be
permitted or required to finance government litigation presents the same tradeoffs
between allocative efficiency and distributive fairness that have been aired in
the commentary on user fees. Understanding these questions, not as discrete
policy dilemmas but as part of the broader privatization phenomenon, helps
clarify the interests at stake and suggests useful avenues for normative
assessment.22
As is true of privatization elsewhere, outsourcing the government’s legal
work may or may not be cost-effective, depending on the work in question and
how the government selects and supervises private attorneys. Contracting out is
easiest to defend on efficiency grounds when the government needs to expand
its capacity in the short-term—to handle a temporary spike in litigation, for
example, or for cases that require special expertise. Although private attorneys
often have higher effective hourly rates than government attorneys, it may still
be cheaper for the government to “buy” the necessary manpower on an asneeded basis than to “make” it in the form of a long-term, full-time employee.
Matters are more complicated for work that recurs regularly. Here, competition
is critical. In the absence of meaningful competition for government legal work,
replacing government employees with private contractors may well increase the
costs of public litigation.
Even if we could be sure that privatizing the performance of government
litigation would be cheaper, important questions would remain. Generally speaking, outsourcing is most appealing in areas where ends matter more than means:
“The more precisely a task can be specified in advance and its performance
evaluated after the fact, the more certainly contractors can be made to

21. See Reynolds, supra note 19, at 387 (“[I]f the service or infrastructure is deemed to provide an
important benefit to the general welfare, dues will be an inappropriate revenue raising technique.”).
22. For example, contingent-fee arrangements between state attorneys general and private counsel
drew substantial academic attention in the wake of the multistate tobacco lawsuits. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Capra et al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys’ Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827 (1999) (moderating
a panel discussion on the policies and professional responsibility issues related to attorneys’ fees in
tobacco litigation); John C. Coffee, Jr., “When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”: Myth and Reality About the
Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241 (2001); David A. Dana, Public
Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 323–28 (2001). Yet the commentary has tended to view such
arrangements in isolation, rather than recognizing them as part of a broader set of practices involving
private attorneys and private sources of financing for government litigation.
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compete . . . .”23 Relying on private actors to perform public work becomes
more problematic when objective truth is elusive, or where value judgments and
discretion reign. Government litigation is nothing if not discretionary. Particularly in a system dominated by settlements and plea bargains, the choices
government litigators make about what claims to pursue and what remedies to
seek carry profound consequences for the “law in action.” Privatization empowers private attorneys to exercise discretion on the public’s behalf. But private
attorneys may bring different incentives, and different habits of practice, to their
work for the government. For example, private attorneys may be more likely
than salaried government employees to focus on maximizing financial penalties,
or on winning cases at all costs. Competition for government contracts—while
critical to cost-savings—may exacerbate those incentives by encouraging private attorneys to emphasize easily quantifiable indicia of effectiveness, such as
win rates or dollars recovered. The consequence is that government litigation
may be changed, not just cheaper, when private attorneys are involved.
On the question of financing, the privatization literature suggests the greatest
need for caution in areas marked by substantial externalities and where distributive concerns are strongest. Both sets of considerations counsel against private
funding in the litigation context. Private financing threatens to skew government litigation away from the public interest and toward the more narrow
interests of donors.24 By treating public litigation as an item up for sale,
moreover, private financing diminishes the expressive value of public litigation,
sapping its civic and moral import.
More broadly, both approaches to privatizing public litigation allow private
actors to stand in the shoes of government, to exercise aspects of sovereign
power. As such, litigation privatization triggers concerns about democratic
governance that are familiar to the broader debates over the private role in
government.25 But this particular form of privatization also raises questions
23. DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 79 (emphasis omitted).
24. Private financing is not the only way that private interests might influence government litigation,
of course. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2014, at A1 (describing influence via lobbyists). Private financing is a particularly direct means of
influence, however, and unlike lobbying and campaign contributions, it can be regulated without
triggering serious First Amendment concerns. See infra notes 275–79 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between private financing of government services and private financing of candidates’ campaigns).
25. As with privatization in other contexts, some aspects of litigation privatization have inspired
constitutional challenges grounded in due process or the separation of powers. See, e.g., Martin H.
Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and Political Implications,
18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 80–81 (2010) (arguing that contingent-fee arrangements between government and private attorneys violate the Due Process Clause). Courts have largely rebuffed such
challenges, though due process challenges have found some traction in criminal cases. See State v.
Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2000) (sustaining a due process challenge to a prosecution led by a
private attorney whose hourly fees were paid by a special interest group); see also infra note 98 (due
process challenges to contingent-fee arrangements); infra note 244 (due process challenges to private
prosecutors); infra note 262 (separation of powers challenges to contingent-fee arrangements); cf.
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987) (using supervisory
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unique to litigation concerning the purposes of public litigation and its relationship to purely private suits. Decades of scholarship have mapped the differences
between public and private enforcement of the law.26 Courts and policymakers
likewise distinguish between public and private litigation in countless ways,
treating them as distinct categories even in areas where they overlap. The core
distinctions rest on the interests served and the incentives of those who serve
them: Whereas private litigation typically seeks to vindicate the interests of the
parties (and their attorneys), litigation by the government is supposed to promote the public interest.27 Privatization upsets those distinctions, smuggling
aspects of private litigation into litigation in the government’s name. It therefore
pushes us to think more carefully about what we expect from government
litigation and how we ought to treat it.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by sketching the characteristic attributes of public and private litigation, then introduces the possibility of
merger—instances in which private actors participate in public litigation. The
discussion focuses on two types of privatization. In one, private attorneys
perform legal work on behalf of the government; in the other, private actors
finance government litigation. Parts II (private performance) and III (private
financing) examine the benefits and risks of each approach to privatization.
The particulars vary, but the net effect of both types of privatization is the
same. Privatization makes public litigation more, well, private. Private attorneys
and financiers imbue public litigation with private norms and direct it toward
private goals. Though that consequence is important in its own right, it also
suggests some of the longer term costs of privatizing public litigation. As Part
IV explains, government litigation currently offers a path around the many—
and mounting—obstacles that stand in the way of private litigation.28 Privatization gives private interests access to that route, allowing them to make their way
to court in the shoes of the government. The path may not stay open indefinitely,
however. Opponents of private litigation are already expanding their focus to
take in government litigants, arguing that limitations on private suits should be

authority to forbid a private firm from prosecuting a contempt action on behalf of the government
where the firm also represented one of the parties in a civil action); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310,
322 (Cal. 1996) (holding that private financing for a criminal prosecution created a conflict of interest
for the district attorney requiring recusal under state law). But see People v. Looney, 145 N.E. 365, 367
(Ill. 1924) (“There is no rule which declares the private subscription of funds for the prevention,
discovery, or prosecution of crime to be contrary to public policy.”).
26. See infra Part I.A. More recently, scholars have begun to explore areas where public and private
litigation intersect. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE
L.J. 616 (2013); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to
Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011).
27. See infra Part IV.A.
28. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 668–75 (2012) (describing challenges for
private litigation, especially class actions).
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applied to government actions as well.29 To the extent that privatization blurs
the lines between public and private litigation, it may also spell the end of legal
rules and practices that treat government differently, cutting off access to courts
for public and private interests alike.
I. THE PRIVATE ROLES IN PUBLIC LITIGATION
Privatization can take various forms. At its extreme, privatization entails a
shift from a fully public to a fully private model, as when a government sells off
a state-owned enterprise.30 In the United States, privatization typically results in
hybrid arrangements in which private actors either finance the provision of
services by public actors or deliver services that might otherwise be performed
by government.31
Consider garbage collection—a favorite example of privatization buffs. A
municipality that followed a public approach to garbage collection would
purchase its own trucks and employ its own garbage collectors.32 Citizens
would pay for trash collection collectively, via taxes, and would receive the
same level of service whether they wanted it or not. In a private model, by
contrast, the government would leave garbage collection to the market. Individuals and households would engage private firms to pick up their trash and would
pay them directly.
Between these two extremes lie a variety of arrangements in which public
and private actors collaborate in the financing and delivery of public services.
The most common type of public–private hybrid occurs when government
outsources the performance of some government service to private actors.33 In
our garbage example, rather than buying garbage trucks and employing garbage
collectors, a municipality might enter into a contract with one or more private
firms to collect the city’s trash.
A different approach to privatization would combine public performance with
private financing. Although public employees might do the work of garbage

29. See Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 57 (2012) (“It
does not seem coincidental . . . that just when the battle in the United States against private class actions
seems to have been won and just as American consumer protection advocates are turning their attention
to public litigation, a new genre of attacks on state attorneys’ general suits is emerging, arguing that
they are really class actions in disguise.” (footnote omitted)).
30. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 6 (“In other countries, privatization has been mostly a matter of
selling off parts of an abundant stock of public assets.”).
31. See id. at 7–8.
32. The model sketched here is not fully public because the municipality is buying garbage trucks
rather than creating them. For the sake of simplicity, the discussion here focuses on the public (or
private) nature of government service delivery, bracketing questions related to the specific hardware
itself.
33. See Michaels, supra note 13, at 1025 (describing government service contracting as “ubiquitous”
and “mainstream”); Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, In Washington, Contractors Take on Biggest Role
Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/washington/04contract.
html?pagewanted⫽all (describing contracting out as “the government’s reflexive answer to almost
every problem”).
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collection, their efforts would be financed by private payments rather than tax
revenues. For example, some cities require residents to buy special garbage
bags if they wish to take advantage of municipal trash-collection services.34 The
bags are expensive, as the price reflects the costs of collection as well as
the cost of the plastic itself. The upshot is that only those citizens who use the
service pay for it, and they pay according to the volume of trash they produce.
Commentators have explored privatization across a range of government
functions, including regulatory policymaking, prison administration, and military combat—to name just a few.35 Yet privatization remains uncharted territory in
the context of litigation. Although scholars have extensively analyzed the relationship
between public and private litigation, few have focused on hybrid arrangements in
which private actors perform, or pay for, litigation undertaken by the government.
A simple 2x2 matrix illustrates the possibilities:36

Collective/public payment

Individual/private
payment

Public
performance

A. Public: government attorneys
litigate cases on behalf of the
government using resources
drawn from tax revenues

C. Private financing: private
individuals or groups
donate money to support
litigation by the
government

Private
performance

B. Private performance:
government entities hire
private attorneys to do legal
work for the government

D. Private: private plaintiffs
hire private attorneys to
handle litigation on their
behalf

The upper left quadrant (A) captures what most of us imagine when we think
of public litigation: government attorneys—federal, state, or local—litigate
cases on behalf of the government, using funds drawn from collective tax
payments.37 In contrast, the lower right quadrant (D) features private clients,
private attorneys, and private financing. The remaining two quadrants combine
aspects of public and private litigation, resulting in government litigation that is

34. See, e.g., Curbside Trash Collection, CITY OF PORTLAND, ME., www.portlandmaine.gov/502/
Curbside-Trash-Collection (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
35. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005);
Freeman, supra note 13, at 636–57 (describing privatization of regulation); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005).
36. The matrix below is adapted from DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 7 (mapping the possibilities for
privatization more generally). This Article focuses on private interventions into government litigation,
but does not address the converse—where government supports private litigation with subsidies or
other financial support and/or through the work of government lawyers. Government intervention into
private litigation is an interesting topic in its own right, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.
37. Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,
38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 45 (2000) (defining public enforcement of law as “the use of public agents
(inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules”).
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either performed by private lawyers (B) or financed by private interests (C). The
remainder of this Part describes each category in more detail. The discussion
begins by outlining the differences between public and private litigation (that is,
between quadrants A and D), then turns to alternatives in which public and
private are merged. Tracking the labels of the matrix, section B describes
scenarios in which government outsources legal work to private attorneys.
Section C takes up the question of private financing for government litigation.
Section C also considers cases in which private actors supply both legal work
and funding—creating an action that would seem fully private but for the
all-important detail of the government’s name on the caption.
A. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE CHOICE

Who should enforce the law in court: private parties or public servants? In the
United States, the answer has always been “it depends.” We rely on a mix of
public and private litigation, though the balance has shifted over the years as
private enforcement has gained prominence in some areas once dominated by
government,38 and has given way to public authority in other contexts.39
There is a rich literature on the relative strengths and weaknesses of public
and private enforcement of the law.40 The commentary builds from the recognition that litigation is a matter of choice. Litigants of all types—both governmental and private—decide whether to sue, what targets to pursue, what claims to
assert, what remedies to seek, and so on. (Although the literature tends to focus
on affirmative litigation, defensive litigation presents many of the same choices.)
Litigation, in other words, vests litigants with significant discretion. How
litigants exercise that discretion depends on who they are. Because public and
private litigants have different incentives and capabilities, it stands to reason
that they will lead public and private litigation down different paths.41 The
precise location of those paths, and the distance between them, will depend on a
variety of contextual factors. This section sketches the conventional distinctions
between government litigation and the private alternatives, and then discusses
areas where the division blurs.
Standard economic theory predicts that private parties will sue if, and only if,
the expected value of the litigation outweighs the expected costs. For private

38. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S.
6–16 (2010) (detailing the rise of private enforcement in late 20th century); Engstrom, supra note 26, at
627–29 (same).
39. See infra notes 227–38 and accompanying text (describing the shift from private to public
responsibility for criminal prosecutions).
40. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
41. See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui
Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913 (2014) (describing conventional distinctions between public
and private litigation and examining how the differences affect practice in one area of law).
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litigants, the benefits of suit typically are private benefits: damages and/or
injunctive relief that will benefit the plaintiffs personally.42 The same assumption holds for private attorneys, most of whom will take a case only if the
expected payoff exceeds the costs of the litigation, including the cost of
foregoing other work.
A litigation system propelled solely by private incentives has significant
limitations. One is that private actors may underinvest in socially beneficial
litigation. Litigation produces various public goods; among other things, it
deters wrongful behavior and contributes to an evolving body of precedent.43
Private parties may not care much about general deterrence or law development,
however, particularly if the litigants are “one shotters” who do not anticipate
future encounters with the courts.44 Thus, an injured citizen may decide not to
sue if the costs of litigation exceed the available damages, or if the appropriate
remedy is nonmonetary. And an attorney may decline a case if it threatens to
gobble up time and resources while promising only a minimal payoff.45 The
social benefit of the suit may be substantial, but the stake to any individual may
be too small to justify the cost.46 There is reason to worry, then, that a purely
private system would produce too little litigation.47
At the same time, private actors will tend to overinvest in socially wasteful
litigation. Private parties (and attorneys) have ample incentives to litigate in
areas where prevailing plaintiffs can recover large damages, for example. But
42. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to
Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 579 (1997) (noting that private litigants are more
concerned with personal benefits than social purposes).
43. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 99–104 (2005).
44. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (distinguishing between repeat players and one-shotters).
45. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 790 (2011) (noting that
“high litigation costs coupled with a low expected recovery can make finding a lawyer difficult
indeed”).
46. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1193, 1214 n.72 (1982) (“When the social benefits of eliminating an unlawful activity are widely
shared, the stake of any individual is often small and each individual can enjoy a ‘free ride’ on the
enforcement efforts of others. As a result, no individual may have sufficient incentive to bring suit.”).
47. See Shavell, supra note 42, at 582 (explaining that “the social benefits of suit could be . . . greater
than the private benefits, and thus that suit . . . might not be brought when it should be”). This concern,
though conventional in the literature on public and private litigation, should not be overstated. It gives
inadequate weight to mechanisms like the modern class action, which provide ways to manage free
riders and aggregate small stakes so that they add up to something that promises an attractive attorney’s
fee. It also ignores the reality of public interest law—a branch of litigation that is private in form but
public in orientation. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. For a small taste of the literature on
public interest lawyering, see ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (2013); CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A.
Scheingold eds., 2006); Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights
from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603 (2009); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law:
The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027 (2008). For an effort to make sense of public interest
lawyering from an economic perspective, see BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978).
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high damage awards do not necessarily correlate with effective deterrence. In
some cases deterrence may be minimal, notwithstanding hefty damages, because “there is little injurers can do to reduce harm.”48 In other areas, the
penalty may exceed the harm, as where multiple or punitive damages are
available. Although supracompensatory penalties often reflect efforts to economize on enforcement, they may induce financially motivated private parties to
devote more resources to enforcement—which may, in turn, result in
“overenforcement.”49
In short, a system in which private actors controlled all the levers of litigation
would likely produce too little deterrence, and too much waste. As Steven
Shavell famously put it, there is a “fundamental divergence between the private
and the social motive to use the legal system.”50 That divergence helps explain
why our system relies on the government to perform and pay for certain
important litigation functions.
Public litigation differs in important ways from the private analogue. Rather
than focusing on private costs and benefits, public litigants are expected to
consider the full consequences of suit, including effects on the court system,
opposing parties, and third parties.51 As a result, they can practice “discretionary nonenforcement,” abstaining from suits that might be profitable in the short
term but promise little public payoff.52 Whereas private litigation serves private
interests, public litigation aims to vindicate the public interest.53 That, at least,
is the ideal.
Various institutional features work—albeit imperfectly—to tether government litigation to the public interest. To begin with, public attorneys usually are
salaried government employees who do not stand to benefit in any direct,
immediate way from a successful action. The lack of financial motivation
allows them to focus on claims with the most significant impact, as opposed to
the most lucrative.54
Like other lawyers, moreover, government attorneys are subject to ethical
rules that demand zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients.55 The clients in
public litigation typically are government officials and institutions who are
48. Shavell, supra note 42, at 578.
49. Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 15 (describing the “overenforcement theorem”).
50. Shavell, supra note 42, at 575.
51. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 897
(2014).
52. Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 38.
53. See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789 (2000) (“It is an uncontroversial
proposition in mainstream American legal thought that government lawyers have greater responsibilities to pursue the common good or the public interest than their counterparts in private practice . . . .”).
54. Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 15 (“In the case of public enforcement, [a] high fine need not
be taken as a signal to invest greater resources in crime prevention, since the public enforcer is not
constrained to act as a private profit maximizer.”).
55. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .”); id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act
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themselves duty-bound to serve the public interest.56 And, in some cases, the
only client is the public itself. When a government prosecutor decides to pursue
charges against a criminal defendant, for example, or a state attorney general
initiates affirmative litigation seeking to redress some harm to the state’s
citizens, there is no agency to act as intermediary between the public and the
attorney. The attorney acts in the name of the state and its citizens, and her
obligation is to the public generally.
The duties embodied in formal ethical rules are reinforced by institutional
norms that emphasize government lawyering as public service. Many lawyers
choose government work “out of a devotion to public service” and a belief that
their work will promote the public good.57 Those ideals are reflected in an
inscription that rings the space outside the U.S. Attorney General’s Office: “The
United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”58
Perhaps most importantly, government litigators are subject to various democratic controls that are foreign to private litigation. Government litigants operate
with set—and often quite limited—budgets, determined by legislative appropriations. Unlike their counterparts in private practice, they cannot borrow against
the prospect of a successful suit and a large recovery.59 Limited budgets mean
that government litigators must pick their battles carefully. And the budgeting
process means that decisions about the absolute level of government litigation
are made, in part, by the people’s representatives in the legislature and the
White House.
Elected officials can also shape public litigation in other ways. The President
appoints agency heads with the advice and consent of the Senate and, with the
exception of independent agencies, can remove them at will.60 Moreover,
government litigation is marked by centralization within the executive branch,
particularly at the federal level: the Department of Justice handles most litigation for the United States and its agencies.61 Centralization helps ensure that
public litigation adheres to a coherent set of guiding principles, and that those
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client’s behalf.”).
56. Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 235, 269 (1999) (“Whether one views the client as the government, a government agency or a
government official, the client is distinctive in at least this respect: the client owes fiduciary duties to
the public.”).
57. Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1442 (1998); Berenson, supra note 53, at 830 (suggesting that
“idealism, or a desire to serve the public interest, might indeed be a significant motivating factor in
lawyers’ decisions to seek work in public service”).
58. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Dep’t
Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors-0 (describing
the inscription).
59. See Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 36–37.
60. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1137, 1152 (2014) (linking appointment and removal procedures to notions of political
accountability).
61. Devins & Herz, supra note 9, at 560.
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principles reflect the current Administration’s vision of the public interest.62 Not
surprisingly, studies show significant shifts in the enforcement efforts of federal
agencies as presidential and congressional politics change.63
While there is less centralization in most state systems, there is more direct
accountability. Whereas the federal Attorney General, U.S. Attorneys, and heads
of DOJ’s various divisions are political appointees, most state attorneys general
and district attorneys are elected officials.64 Such attorneys represent the public
in a dual sense—politically as well as legally—and the prospect of periodic
elections links their professional fortunes to the interests of their constituents.
The upshot of all this is not that public litigation is superior to private
litigation, but that it is different. Public and private litigation empower different
actors and promote different interests. Just as public interests would be illserved by a purely private model of litigation, private interests would suffer if
government litigation were the only game in town. Precisely because public and
private interests often diverge, a system of litigation devoted to the public
interest would leave many private harms without remedy, many private goals
unmet.65 The hard question for system designers is how to achieve an optimal
mix of public and private litigation so as to leverage the strengths, and compensate for the weaknesses, of each model.
Although the differences between public and private litigation are critical—
indeed, it is impossible to understand the privatization of government litigation
without an appreciation of how public and private are likely to differ premerger—
they should not be overstated. Every government agency is staffed and run by
individuals with private goals and interests. Although government attorneys are
sworn to serve the public interest, private considerations may influence how
they exercise their considerable discretion. For example, government lawyers
may worry about their future job prospects,66 or they may shy away from

62. Id. at 570; cf. Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1987) (“Although the public interest as a reified concept may
not be ascertainable, the Constitution establishes procedures for approximating that ideal through
election, appointment, confirmation, and legislation.”).
63. See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 718 n.84
(2011) (citing sources).
64. See Sara Sun Beale, Prosecutorial Discretion in Three Systems: Balancing Conflicting Goals
and Providing Mechanisms for Control, in DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
27, 32 (Michele Caianiello & Jacqueline S. Hodgson eds., 2015) (“Forty seven states elect their chief
prosecutors.”); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006) (noting that forty-three
states provide for popular election of the attorney general).
65. See generally Lemos, supra note 26 (raising concerns about the fate of private interests in
representative litigation by state attorneys general).
66. See Tom McGinty, Staffer One Day, Opponent the Next, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2010, at C1
(discussing the “revolving door” at the SEC); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Risky Business: The Credit
Crisis and Failure (Part III), 104 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 441, 449–50 (2010), http://www.
northwesternlawreview.org/online/risky-business-credit-crisis-and-failure-part-iii (suggesting that “[c]oncerns about future career opportunities” influenced SEC official who declined to pursue enforcement
action with respect to Allen Stanford’s alleged Ponzi scheme); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
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important cases for fear of igniting political controversies,67 focusing instead on
low-stakes issues with relatively scant social benefit.68 In other circumstances,
political and reputational considerations might spur government attorneys—or
the entities they represent—to take unduly aggressive action.69
The converse also is true, as private litigants and lawyers often work in
service of public ends. The point is most obvious with respect to public interest
firms,70 which self-consciously select cases with an eye to the social benefit,
and which often are funded by donations by like-minded citizens rather than the
spoils of litigation.71 Yet even for-profit litigation can be public-oriented. Indeed, the U.S. legal system relies heavily on litigation by private parties and
attorneys to resolve disputes peacefully, develop bodies of precedent, and
regulate primary behavior.72 Because we recognize that private parties might
not internalize the full social benefits of their litigation efforts—and therefore
might have inadequate incentives to litigate—our system takes pains to encourage valuable private suits through sweeteners like damage enhancements, attorney-fee shifts, and the like.73 Such provisions help support the work of so-called
private attorneys general—private actors who pursue litigation in the public

P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105,
1117–18 (1995) (describing government lawyers’ incentives to engage in career building).
67. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Let the Securities and Exchange Commission Outsource Enforcement
by Litigation: A Proposal, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 111, 113 (2010) (arguing that “political pressure may
thwart [SEC] accusations of large organizations and renowned defendants”); Judith Burns & Kara
Scannell, SEC Brings Fewer Enforcement Cases, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at C3 (noting former SEC
attorney’s allegations that supervisors refused to take testimony from a former Wall Street chief
executive who “was a major fund-raiser for President Bush” and had “political connections and clout”).
68. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 57, at 1444–45. In the securities realm, for example, critics have
argued that the SEC tends to pursue relatively small targets, in part because “small cases settle fast, cost
less, but show larger settlement or conviction numbers than one large case that is likely to bring about a
tough fight with well-endowed large law firms and would last far longer.” Frankel, supra note 67, at
113; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the SEC’s Bark Worse Than Its Bite?, NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2012, at
10, 10 (bemoaning the SEC’s apparent preference for small cases).
69. See Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class
Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 106–07 (2004) (identifying predatory prosecution as a potential
risk of public enforcement).
70. The term public interest law is increasingly contested, as lawyers pursuing conservative causes
enter a field previously dominated by the political left. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 47, at 5–8;
Ann Southworth, What Is Public Interest Law? Empirical Perspectives on an Old Question, 62 DEPAUL
L. REV. 493, 494 (2013).
71. See Rhode, supra note 47, at 2053–58 (describing funding for public interest law firms).
72. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669,
669 (1986) (“Probably to a unique degree, American law relies upon private litigants to enforce
substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public
enforcement agencies.”).
73. Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 785–95 (2011); see also
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1543, 1586 (2014) (linking the rise of private enforcement in the late 20th century to “the fact that
Congress provided incentives that made certain types of litigation . . . promising opportunities for the
investment of lawyers’ time and money”).
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interest, often with no prospect of direct personal gain.74 Even sweeter are the
qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, which empower private plaintiffs to
sue private defendants for fraud against the United States and to keep a portion
of the proceeds.75
Thus, public and private efforts may at times converge as private litigants
pursue public goals. Such public-spirited private litigation raises difficult questions about whether and to what extent we should empower private actors to
vindicate the interests of a public they do not formally represent.76 But government litigation remains in the background, capable of filling in where private
efforts fall short, or—in many areas—altering or even ending private litigation
that government officials deem to be misguided.77
Privatization, as the term is employed here, is different.78 Privatization entails
more than an overlap between public and private; it is a fusion of the two, with
private actors and private interests participating in litigation in the name of the
government.
B. PRIVATE PERFORMANCE

The lower left quadrant of the matrix introduces the first approach to privatization, whereby private attorneys perform some aspect of litigation on behalf of

74. See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (discussing the possible benefits of private attorneys general).
75. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012). Qui tam suits may be viewed as part of the
privatization phenomena I explore here. Such suits differ in one important respect, however: although
qui tam relators are authorized to sue on behalf of the United States, they do not litigate as the
government itself. As the Supreme Court has explained, the False Claims Act “can reasonably be
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.” Vt. Agency of Nat.
Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000). Thus, although qui tam suits serve to
vindicate the interests of the United States (and the United States takes the lion’s share of the recovery),
relators also “are suing to vindicate their own rights.” Redish, supra note 25, at 97; see also Vt. Agency,
529 U.S. at 772 (“[T]he statute gives the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit . . . .” (emphasis
omitted)). Moreover, “the very nature of the process makes formally clear to anyone concerned that a
private actor motivated by financial concerns, in addition to the government, is a party to the suit
against the private defendant.” Redish, supra note 25, at 98.
76. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
55, 58–64 (1989) (raising practical and constitutional concerns about citizen-suit provisions of environmental laws).
77. Engstrom, supra note 26, at 623 (“[M]any of our most consequential regulatory regimes have
evolved in recent decades into hybrids of public and private enforcement in which multiple enforcers—
including federal and state administrative agencies, private litigants, and state attorneys general—
operate and interact within complex ecologies of enforcement.”).
78. Some scholars have used similar terminology to describe our system’s growing reliance on
private litigation to vindicate public ends. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988). Such private litigation is public in some senses—it is
public-serving, and it involves public law. The term public litigation is employed here in a more limited
sense, to refer to litigation in the government’s name. Privatization, in turn, refers to the private roles in
such litigation.
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the government.79 At the federal level, for example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regularly contracts with private attorneys to handle the agency’s litigation work with respect to failing banks.80 Similarly, the DOJ contracts
with private attorneys to litigate claims regarding nontax debts owed to the
United States.81 Both arrangements tend to involve long-term contracts in
which private firms handle a bundle of cases. In other instances, government
agencies reach out to private counsel to help with a specific case, as when
DOJ’s antitrust division hired David Boies to litigate the blockbuster antitrust
case against Microsoft.82
The federal government’s arrangements with private counsel are governed by
a complicated overlay of constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, and
executive guidance that prohibit agencies from contracting out “inherently
governmental functions.”83 The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR)
Act defines that term to include functions “so intimately related to the public
interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.”84 The
Office of Federal Procurement Policy has interpreted the FAIR Act to preclude
outside contracts for the “control of prosecutions” and the “[r]epresentation of
the government before administrative and judicial tribunals, unless a statute
expressly authorizes the use of attorneys whose services are procured through
contract.”85 The upshot is that outsourcing requires both legislative authoriza-

79. It bears emphasis that the lines dividing the four cells of the matrix are more porous in reality
than they appear on paper. For example, “in many small towns it is not uncommon for many
governmental lawyering functions to be performed by private attorneys acting on a part-time basis.”
David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public–Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of “Substitute”
Attorneys General, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 423, 429. It is not entirely clear whether part-time
government attorneys should register as public or private as a formal matter, or what kinds of
relationships with government are required to move attorneys from the contractor to employee box.
This Article does not attempt to resolve the difficult questions of categorization that may arise at the
borders of privatization, though the analysis here should help illuminate the relevant normative
considerations.
80. William V. Luneburg, Contracting by the Federal Government for Legal Services: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 399, 451–52 (1988).
81. See 31 U.S.C. § 3718(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“The Attorney General may make contracts retaining
private counsel to furnish legal services, including representation in negotiation, compromise, settlement, and litigation, in the case of any claim of indebtedness owed the United States.”).
82. See Bumiller, supra note 1.
83. Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 5(2), 112 Stat.
2382, 2384.
84. Id. § 5(2)(A). That definition includes activities that require “either the exercise of discretion in
applying Federal Governmental authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the
Federal Government” so as “to bind the United States to take or not to take some action” or “to
significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons.” Id. § 5(2)(B)(i, iii).
85. Notice of Policy on Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed.
Reg. 56,227, 56,240, 56,241 (Office of Mgmt. & Budget Sept. 12, 2011) (effective Oct. 12, 2011). The
FAIR Act does not apply to private attorneys who are hired on a temporary basis as “special
government employee[s].” 18 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (defining “special government employee” to mean
an employee hired to perform “temporary duties” for up to 130 days during any 365-day period). David
Boies held that designation when he led the Microsoft litigation for DOJ, as have other private lawyers
who have worked for DOJ on more recent cases. See Melissa Lipman, DOJ Adds Munger Tolles
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tion and sufficient oversight by government officials so that private attorneys
cannot be said to exercise final, independent authority to “bind” the United
States.86 The Office of Legal Counsel has taken the position that such oversight
also is required by the Appointments and Take Care Clauses.87 The test is
formal and easily satisfied: it focuses on the government’s reservation of
ultimate authority and “eschews any weighing of the functional importance of
the private [attorney’s] role” or “pragmatic evaluation of how influential [a
private attorney] may be.”88
Private attorneys play an even greater role in public litigation at the state and
local levels, where budgets tend to be more limited and the regulatory framework governing outsourcing even more permissive. State attorneys general
routinely hire outside counsel to handle aspects of the state’s litigation work.
For example, in 2011 the Kansas Attorney General announced that he had hired
the largest private firm in the state to help defend against lawsuits challenging
new state laws related to licensing abortion clinics and distributing healthcare
funding. The arrangement came under fire after it was reported that the firm,
which charges upwards of $300 per hour of attorney work, also represents the
Koch brothers.89
In many cases, outside counsel works for the state on a contingency basis.90
Contingent-fee arrangements between private attorneys and state attorneys genPartner to AT&T Merger Team, LAW360 (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/287
955/doj-adds-munger-tolles-partner-to-at-t-merger-team (describing DOJ’s reliance on private lawyers
in major antitrust cases). Special government employees are subject to less restrictive rules governing
salary and compensation, nonfinancial conflicts of interest, and so on. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 203–209
(2012); Luneburg, supra note 80, at 464–65.
86. See FAIR Act of 1998 § 5(2)(B)(iii).
87. Memorandum from William P. Barr, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Gen.
Counsel, Justice Mgmt. Div., at 97 (Apr. 27, 1990) (“Properly appointed federal officials must maintain
both legal and effective control over the direction of United States policy . . . .”) (on file with author).
But cf. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Gen.
Counsels of the Fed. Gov’t, at 143 n.53 (May 7, 1996) (disavowing the stronger position, taken in
earlier memoranda, that any person representing the United States in court must be appointed pursuant
to the Appointments Clause). The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988),
offers a sense of the level of control required by Article II. There, the Court rejected a challenge to the
role of independent counsel, as an “inferior officer,” notwithstanding that “she possesses a degree of
independent discretion to exercise the powers delegated to her under the [Independent Counsel] Act,”
including the “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial
functions of the Department of Justice.” Id. at 671. The Court emphasized that independent counsel was
subject to removal by the Attorney General, empowered to perform “only certain, limited duties,” and
her “office is limited in jurisdiction.” Id. 671–72.
88. Krent, supra note 17, at 542–43 (describing federal statutory and constitutional limits on
privatization generally).
89. Jan Biles, AG Defends Outside Counsel Decision, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J. (July 15, 2011, 3:31 PM),
http://m.cjonline.com/news/2011-07-15/ag-defends-outside-counsel-decision#gsc.tab⫽0.
90. Contingent-fee arrangements are less common at the federal level, where an Executive Order
prohibits the hiring of private counsel on a contingency basis. See Exec. Ord. No. 13433, 3 C.F.R.
13,433 (2007). The order exempts attorneys hired to assist the government in the recovery of nontax
debts under sections 3178 and 3711 of Title 31, United States Code. See infra notes 146–49 and
accompanying text (describing contingent fees in the debt-collection context); see also Grimaldi &
Mundy, supra note 2 (describing contingent-fee arrangements between private firms and the National
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eral became headline news in the 1990s when the states inked a landmark $206
billion settlement with the major tobacco companies. Many of the states had
turned to private counsel to handle their share of the legal work, and some of
those attorneys took home jaw-dropping sums in fees.91 More recently, states
have used private contingent-fee counsel to perform government work in suits
against lead-paint producers, poultry companies, and HMOs, among others.92
Attorneys general are not the only state officials who use outside counsel,
including contingent-fee lawyers. State pension funds play an active role in
securities litigation, for example, often serving as lead plaintiff. Increasingly,
the states are represented by private law firms working for contingent fees.93
Those firms are selected by officials like state comptrollers and treasurers,
with the consequence that state treasurers now enjoy generous campaign contributions from law firms hoping to cash in on lucrative legal work.94
Contracting out is also common at the local level. In the wake of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, for example, several Louisiana cities hired contingent-fee private counsel to help them pursue claims against BP. Perhaps more
surprisingly, cities and towns often rely on private attorneys to handle criminal
prosecutions. One city recently hired a private law firm to prosecute municipal
code violations at $180 per hour; another paid a private firm a flat fee of
$201,700 for a year’s worth of prosecutions in municipal court; and a third paid
a private firm to handle certain criminal appeals for $300 per case.95
State law on contracting out government work is relatively undeveloped as a
general matter,96 though some states have adopted statutes governing contingentfee arrangements.97 And, while state courts have indicated that such arrangements would run afoul of constitutional limits if used in criminal prosecutions,
they have generally condoned other approaches to outsourcing state and local
litigation, provided that government officials retain ultimate authority over the

Credit Union Administration, which, as an independent agency, claims an exemption from the executive
order).
91. See Robert A. Levy, The Great Tobacco Robbery: Hired Guns Corral Contingent Fee Bonanza,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at 27, 27 (reporting that some private attorneys earned contingent fees equal
to more than $105,000 an hour).
92. See Mark A. Behrens & Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement:
Procedural Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 173, 177–78 & nn.26–29 (2006) (describing various contingent-fee arrangements
between state attorneys general and private counsel); Adam Liptak, A Deal for the Public: If You Win,
You Lose, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A10 (same).
93. Coffee, supra note 22, at 242–43.
94. Id. at 244.
95. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 417 & nn.17–19 (2009).
96. Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 142 (2005) (noting that “most states lack any regularized oversight of
contracting”).
97. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
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course and conduct of the case.98 Like the federal rules described above, the
states’ approach has tended to be more formal than functional. For example,
state courts presented with challenges to contingent-fee arrangements have
focused on the language of the relevant contracts to satisfy the requirement of
public control rather than delving into the details of the relationship between
public and private attorneys.99
C. PRIVATE FINANCING

A different kind of privatization is reflected in the upper right quadrant of the
matrix: arrangements in which private interests finance litigation by public
actors.100 Private financing may be case specific or for a certain type of
litigation, and payments may be solicited by the government or volunteered by
donors. In Philadelphia, for example, the District Attorney established a nonprofit corporation to accept contributions for a variety of purposes, including
financing certain prosecutions.101 In another much remarked case, people from
all over the country sent donations to help defray the costs of prosecuting Susan
Smith for the murder of her two young sons after media reports suggested that
the county might not be able to afford a death penalty prosecution.102 More
recently, several states have turned to private funding to support costly litigation
efforts in defense of state law or states’ rights against the federal government.103

98. Courts have reasoned in dicta that contingent-fee arrangements are impermissible in criminal
cases because of the conflict between the private attorney’s financial interest and the imperative of
prosecutorial neutrality. See, e.g., Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.2d 21, 31 n.7 (Cal.
2010) (“It . . . seems beyond dispute that due process would not allow for a criminal prosecutor to
employ private cocounsel pursuant to a contingent-fee arrangement that conditioned the private
attorney’s compensation on the outcome of the criminal prosecution.”); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n., 951
A.2d 428, 475 n.48 (R.I. 2008) (“[W]e are unable to envision a criminal case where contingent fees
would ever be appropriate . . . .”). Those same courts have rejected challenges to the government’s use
of contingent-fee arrangements in civil cases. See Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.2d at 36 (holding that
“retention of private counsel on a contingent-fee basis is permissible in [most civil] cases if neutral,
conflict-free government attorneys retain the power to control and supervise the litigation”); Lead
Indus. Assn., 951 A.2d at 475. Courts have likewise held that private attorneys may participate in
criminal prosecutions on a noncontingency basis, though most have insisted that government attorneys
maintain formal control. See infra notes 243–44.
99. See Leah Godesky, State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee Arrangements: An Affront to
the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 615 (2009); see also Cnty. of Santa Clara,
235 P.2d at 40–41 (emphasizing contractual language stating that government attorneys “retain final
authority over all aspects of the [l]itigation”).
100. Line-drawing can be complicated here, too. See, e.g., People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 317–21
(Cal. 1996) (struggling to distinguish between improper private financing of prosecution and conventional forms of assistance by victims).
101. Joseph E. Kennedy, Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the Differing Protections
of Liberty and Equality in the Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665, 668 (1997).
102. Rebecca A. Pinto, Note, The Public Interest and Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1343, 1346 n.11 (1999).
103. See Elmore, supra note 5 (describing private financing for state challenges to the ACA);
Miriam Jordan, Donors Send Millions to Defend Arizona Law, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304248704575574461341942940?alg⫽y&mg⫽idwsj (reporting that Arizona had collected more than $3.6 million of private donations to help defend its
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Such payments are part of a larger category of voluntary, private gifts to
government.104 Gifts to government are much like voluntary tax payments, but
with one important difference: unlike taxes, voluntary donations can sometimes
be earmarked by citizens for particular uses. Various states have statutes explicitly authorizing the Attorney General to receive gifts “[f]or the purpose of
performing any functions, duties, or responsibilities of the office of the Attorney
General.”105 Other state statutes provide in more general terms that, if a donor
files a “written designation of the fund or appropriation he desires to benefit . . .,
his donation shall be credited accordingly.”106
Earmarking is complicated at the federal level by laws designed to channel
all funding through the general treasury and the congressional budgeting process. The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires federal agencies to turn over any
funds to the general treasury,107 and the Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits agencies
from expending funds in excess of their legislative appropriations.108 Together,
those statutes would appear to prevent federal agencies from using private
donations to support their operations—whether litigation-related or otherwise—in the absence of congressional authorization.109 Importantly, however,
both limitations are subject to statutory override.110 Congress has provided that
the Attorney General may accept gifts on behalf of DOJ “where the donor
intends to donate property for the purpose of preventing or controlling the abuse

controversial immigration law); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-510 (West 2015) (creating a “paincapable unborn child protection act litigation fund,” which may include private gifts, “for the purpose
of providing funds to pay for any costs and expenses incurred by the state attorney general in relation to
actions surrounding defense of [state abortion law]”).
104. Gifts to government institutions must be distinguished from gifts to government employees or
officials, which are prohibited. See, e.g., Richard Rifkin, Gift Giving in the Public Sector, in ETHICAL
STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 249, 249–55 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2008). Gifts to government
institutions are not only permitted, but are encouraged via tax deductions. See I.R.C. § 170(3)(c)(1)
(2012) (providing that gifts to state and federal government are tax deductible, so long as they are made
for “exclusively public purposes”).
105. ALA. CODE § 36-15-4.1 (2015); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-108(1)(b)(I) (West
2015) (“The department of law is authorized to solicit, accept, and expend gifts, grants, and donations
from public and private sources for the purposes of this article [describing exceptions to the general
powers and duties of the Attorney General] . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 19.1 (2015) (creating an
“Attorney General’s Law Enforcement Revolving Fund” which consists of gifts (among other things)
and is available to be “expended by the Attorney General for the purposes of investigation, enforcement
and prosecution of cases involving [state and federal] criminal and forfeiture laws”). Some states have
more targeted gift funds. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 228.290 (2015) (establishing a unit to prosecute
offenses against older persons and providing that “[t]he Unit may . . . accept gifts . . . or donations to
assist the Unit in carrying out its duties”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-m (2015) (creating a cold
case homicide unit and related fund, which may include donations); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-5-24 (West
2015) (creating a special fund for the attorney general to spend on the prevention of crime and violence
and providing that “[t]he fund shall consist of gifts, grants, devises, donations, and bequests of real
property, personal property, or services, from any source, made to the fund”).
106. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16302 (West 2015).
107. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2012).
108. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2012).
109. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1372 (1988).
110. Id. at 1368 (describing statutory “gift authority” enjoyed by many agencies).
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of controlled substances.”111 Another statute provides that “[t]he Attorney General may accept, hold, administer, and use gifts, devises, and bequests of any
property or services for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work of the
Department of Justice.”112
The federal government also benefits from private largesse in ways that fall
outside the ambit of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act and the Anti-Deficiency
Act. For example, when the Justice Department hired David Boies to lead the
Microsoft litigation, the government paid $250 an hour—a bargain compared to
Boies’s normal rate. Boies told a reporter that he expected his total bill to the
Justice Department would total around $100,000. For a corporate client, he said,
“I would have added at least a zero.”113 Boies’s willingness to offer the
government a discount may not be covered by the Miscellaneous Receipts or
Anti-Deficiency Acts, but it is nevertheless a valuable gift.
As the Boies case suggests, in some circumstances private actors both finance
and perform government litigation. Although Boies did not provide any direct
funding for the suit against Microsoft, his decision to charge the DOJ less than
half his normal hourly fee saved the government hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Contingent-fee arrangements like those described above also should be
understood as instances of private financing as well as private performance,
because the private attorney fronts the costs of the litigation and collects
nothing unless the suit is successful.114 Indeed, the cost-shifting advantages of
contingent-fee arrangements are one of their major selling points. Such arrangements allow cash-strapped government agencies to take advantage of top legal
help at no immediate cost to taxpayers.115 In effect, a contingent-fee arrangement operates as a forgivable loan—which is, of course, a form of financing.
An even more obvious melding of financing and performance occurs when
private donors pay private attorneys to perform litigation on behalf of the
government. For example, some states allow the victim of a crime to hire a
private attorney to prosecute the offender in the name of the state.116 A
somewhat different arrangement emerged in the late 1990s in Memphis, Tennessee, when the district attorney appointed a special prosecutor—Larry Parrish, a
former Assistant U.S. Attorney who had developed a reputation as a crusader

111. 21 U.S.C. § 871(c) (2012).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 524(d) (2012).
113. Bumiller, supra note 1.
114. See Wilkins, supra note 79, at 433 (noting that “[c]ontingent fee contracts typically shift some
or all of [the significant up-front costs and expenses] to the outside lawyers”).
115. See John C. Coffee Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 3, 2012, at
23, 24 (arguing that SEC should “retain private counsel on a contingent-fee basis in those large cases
that it cannot staff adequately itself” because doing so would “allow[] the SEC to acquire highly
experienced trial counsel for big cases (without having to pay their salaries for the long term) . . . [and]
economize[] on the SEC’s budget by paying the attorney fees only out of any recovery obtained”).
116. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
659, 689–99 (2010) (describing private prosecutions in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
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against pornography—to spearhead the city’s efforts to shut down topless
bars.117 Parrish’s salary and expenses were paid by private individuals and
groups. One contributor explained:
“I feel that those types of clubs . . . erode our society” . . . . “I think we as
citizens need to do whatever we can do to help, and I knew if I gave money
for this cause, it would go for this cause and not for something else. We’re
government by the people, and obviously I’m part of that government.”118

Similar arrangements are prevalent on the civil side as well, perhaps because
the simplest way for citizens to finance government litigation is to pay private
attorneys to do the work. The recent multistate challenge to the federal Affordable Care Act is an example. The states’ suit was bankrolled in part by the
National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), a private lobbying
group (and another plaintiff in the case), which paid a private firm to handle
most of the legal work.119 Although it is unclear just how much NFIB spent on
the states’ behalf, the amount is likely to have been substantial. Shortly after the
states won a victory in the district court, Florida’s Attorney General Pam Bondi
told lawmakers that NFIB had “dedicated a tremendous amount of resources to
the lawsuit,” and her predecessor, Bill McCullom—who spearheaded the states’
challenge—acknowledged that “NFIB is paying for the bulk of the outside
counsel.”120
Scenarios in which private actors both perform and pay for government
litigation highlight a critical feature of privatization in the litigation context. In
most other areas, the combination of private performance and financing would
result in arrangements that register as fully private. For example, most observers
would refer to a system in which private citizens pay private firms to collect
their trash as a private system of garbage collection. Litigation is different.
Because the client is still the government—and, as the case caption reflects, the
litigation proceeds in the name of the state or federal government, or some arm
of it—it is possible to have formally public litigation that is driven by private
actors. The remainder of this Article explores the consequences.
II. PRIVATE LAWYERS, PUBLIC WORK
Why hire a private firm to do government work? Advocates of privatization
in other contexts argue that contracting out government functions can result in
significant cost savings. Private contractors typically cost less than public
employees, in part because they lack the civil-service protections and generous

117.
118.
119.
120.

Buser, supra note 6, at A1.
Id.
Elmore, supra note 5.
Id.
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benefits that government workers often receive.121 And private contractors have
ample incentives to drive down costs as much as possible so as to maximize
profits.122 Competition for lucrative government contracts sharpens those incentives. Indeed, some commentators suggest that competition—not privatization
as such—“is the key” to efficient delivery of services.123
Similar considerations help explain the government’s widespread reliance on
private lawyers.124 As section A explains, the potential benefits of contracting
out government litigation work are fairly straightforward, and correspond neatly
to themes stressed by proponents of privatization more generally. But the
privatization debates make clear that cost savings do not follow ineluctably
from privatization. If handled poorly, outsourcing might actually be more
expensive than relying on government employees. Section A explores the
financial costs of privatizing government litigation. Section B considers a
different kind of cost: the possibility that placing private attorneys at the helm
of public litigation will change the conduct and focus of that litigation in ways
that diminish its relative strengths.
A. IS OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT LITIGATION EFFICIENT?

At first blush, the privatization of government litigation may be hard to
understand in terms of efficiency. Private attorneys often are paid more—
sometimes much more—than their counterparts in government service.125 Private lawyers also may have longer learning curves than government employees
who are accustomed to performing the work in question. Even at discounted
rates, then, private attorneys may cost significantly more on an hourly basis than
salaried government attorneys. And government attorneys are no slouches—
121. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
122. See Michaels, supra note 13, at 1030–32 (describing the “long-standing efficiency rationale”
for privatization).
123. Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, Evidence,
Prospects, 13 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 67, 75 (1997).
124. The desire to minimize costs is not the only reason for litigation outsourcing, of course. The
government also may turn to outside attorneys in circumstances where government employees are
subject to conflicts of interest. For example, the DOJ hires private attorneys to represent government
officials who may eventually become the targets of a DOJ prosecution. See Kathleen Clark, Paying the
Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways that Government Officials
Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 65, 73 (1997). The appointment of independent counsel is driven
by analogous considerations. See id. at 81. Similarly, many cases involving private prosecutions are
contempt proceedings, where there may be a special need for the judicial branch not to be dependent on
executive-branch attorneys to defend its own authority. See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987) (“The . . . assumption [of Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure] that private attorneys may be used to prosecute contempt actions reflects the longstanding
acknowledgement that the initiation of contempt proceedings to punish disobedience to court orders is a
part of the judicial function.”); O’Neill, supra note 116, at 684 (“The majority of the modern-day cases
involving privately managed prosecutions deal with the issue of whether a private attorney may
lawfully prosecute a contempt citation after an adverse party’s alleged violation of a court order.”).
125. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 51, at 889 (noting that the maximum salary for government
employees on the General Schedule is lower than the starting salary for associates at the nation’s largest
law firms).
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many hold credentials that are “comparable to those of lawyers who work for
the most elite firms in the nation.”126 Why outsource in these circumstances?
1. The Case for Contracting Out: Temporary Needs and Market Discipline
Perhaps the easiest case for outsourcing is where private attorneys possess
special expertise that the government lacks in-house.127 In such circumstances,
it may be cheaper for the government to buy (or, more accurately, to lease) the
necessary legal talent from private sources than to make it in the form of a
full-time government employee—even if private attorneys demand hefty fees.128
On issues the government encounters rarely, outsourcing allows the government
to reduce learning-curve costs by hiring experienced private attorneys.129 The
David Boies example is again helpful. Even DOJ’s Antitrust Division—a
specialized agency—recognized that it could benefit from Boies’s distinctive
talents. The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the case told reporters that
the Division had not handled many major antitrust cases and needed an attorney
with extensive experience: “There’s no substitute for that many years of orchestrating litigation . . . . It’s a high art form.”130
Part of what Boies brought to the table was experience with blockbuster cases
and powerful defendants. As New Orleans’s Mayor Marc Morial put it in a
different context: “You want lawyers who can take on giants.”131 Just as
corporations with in-house legal staffs often turn to outside counsel for the big
case, governments may find it particularly valuable to use private lawyers for
large and/or complex litigation efforts. In addition to expertise, private lawyers
may offer the resources of their firms, including copious support staff. Private
firms with repeat work on big cases can take advantage of economies of scale
126. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Department of Justice Litigation: Externalizing Costs and Searching for
Subsidies, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 173 (1998).
127. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 250 (emphasizing the government’s “need to lease, rather than
buy, specialized legal talent”).
128. Similar considerations govern the choice between in-house and outside corporate counsel. See
Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497,
500 (2008) (“[A] decision whether to bring legal work in-house is a subset of the broader question of
vertical integration: whether a company should make needed products in-house, or whether it should
buy them . . . .”). For a discussion of the “make or buy” decision more generally, see Paul L. Joskow,
Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 319 (Claude Menard & Mary M.
Shirley eds., 2008).
129. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 128, at 507 (“For transactions that a company does not engage in
repetitively, economies of scale may favor outside counsel who frequently engage in that type of
transaction and therefore are able to apportion to more than one client the cost of gaining experience
and expertise.”).
130. Bumiller, supra note 1.
131. Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs’ Attorneys in Municipal Gun
Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS
129, 137 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005). Appearances may also play a role. See SHARON Y. EUBANKS &
STANTON A. GLANTZ, BAD ACTS: THE RACKETEERING CASE AGAINST THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 11 (2013)
(describing DOJ’s decision to create “a David Boies type arrangement” in the early stages of the RICO
case against big tobacco as an effort “to stage a battle of comic book titans. It was all about
appearances.”).
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that make it cost-effective for them to develop sizable “back-office service
departments” to handle logistical work such as proofreading, word-processing,
and so on.132 Government litigation, by contrast, tends to be far more leanly
staffed.133
As the discussion so far suggests, the make-or-buy decision will tend to
weigh in favor of outsourcing legal work that government handles relatively
infrequently. That may mean complicated or especially big cases, but it might
also mean more routine work that is not voluminous enough to support a
full-time employee. Governments typically must pay the full salaries of their
employees regardless of how hard those employees actually work. Any downtime is money down the drain. Thus, governments may be able to save money
by hiring private attorneys—even relatively expensive ones—on an as-needed
basis.134
The case for outsourcing is harder to make for legal work that does recur with
sufficient frequency to support a full-time employee.135 Contracting out such
work may harm the government’s interests in the long run by impeding in-house
expertise and attorney professional development.136 Indeed, a government entity that repeatedly turns to outside counsel for big, complex, challenging—and
interesting—cases may find it more difficult to recruit and retain talented
attorneys.137 In this sense, privatization may be self-reinforcing: the more work
an office outsources, the more it needs to outsource.
The justification for contracting out recurring government work must be that
competition and market discipline will drive private attorneys to perform the
same work at lower cost than salaried government employees.138 Given their
job protections and relatively fixed pay, government employees—including
attorneys—may “have ‘low powered’ incentives compared to private employees.”139 They may be less inclined to work hard, to innovate, to take on difficult

132. Schwarcz, supra note 128, at 508 & n.70 (explaining the use of outside counsel on large
corporate deals and noting that the point would apply with even more force to litigation).
133. Zeppos, supra note 126, at 179–80 n.41.
134. See Fairfax, supra note 95, at 418 (“Particularly in smaller, rural jurisdictions where it is most
prevalent, the outsourcing of the prosecution function is not a choice among alternatives; it is the
recognition of the reality that a public prosecutor is a cost-prohibited luxury.”).
135. Cf. LARRY SMITH, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: HOW BUSINESSES BUY LEGAL SERVICES 245 (2001) (“[There is]
a whole generation of in-house [corporate] counsel that have concluded . . . that repetitive, nonlitigation legal work will usually be handled more cost-efficiently in-house. . . . Not only is the learning
curve for outside counsel eliminated, so too are the myriad small costs of doing business, such as visits
to the client, talking through the issues, etc., that add up significantly from start to finish.”).
136. Cf. Freeman & Minow, supra note 17, at 1, 4–5 (noting “diminished government capacity” as
one of the “most prevalent and provocative objections to contracting”).
137. EUBANKS & GLANTZ, supra note 131, at 11 (describing consternation on the part of DOJ
attorneys when they learned that higher-ups were bringing in a private lawyer to handle a big case).
138. This is, of course, the core justification for privatization more generally. See supra notes
121–23 and accompanying text.
139. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 51, at 889 (quoting Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of
Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 6 (1994)).
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cases, and so on.140 An added advantage of privatization (so the theory goes) is
that a contractual relationship can be revisited each year. It may be easier to
award a contract to a new firm than it is to replace a government employee.141
Thus, a firm whose initial bid is successful has a strong incentive to perform
well in the hope that it will win future government contracts.142
Such considerations appear to have motivated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act Amendments of 1986, which authorized DOJ to contract some of
the government’s litigation work associated with the collection of nontax debts
owed to the United States.143 The amendments were enacted on the theory that
outsourcing offered a cost-effective means of reducing the extensive backlog of
civil cases in U.S. Attorney Offices (USAOs) nationwide. Adopted initially as a
pilot program, the DOJ’s Private Counsel Program now operates in nineteen
“private counsel” districts nationwide, with “further expansion planned.”144 At
least when measured by outputs, the program appears to be a success. In its first
seven years of operation, the average number of pending civil debts declined by
76%.145 And private counsel appear to be diligent in their duties. According to a
recent study documenting an increase in federal suits for the recovery of
defaulted student loans, the four districts with the highest litigation rates—
measured both in absolute numbers and per capita—are all private counsel
districts.146
Yet to say that private attorneys have accomplished more than existing DOJ
staff, circa 1986, is not to suggest that the Private Counsel Program has been
more cost-effective than the alternative strategy of hiring more government
attorneys to litigate debt-collection cases. The attorneys in the Program are

140. See Selmi, supra note 57, at 1442–45 (noting concerns that government attorneys, particularly
careerists, might shirk, avoiding hard cases and hard work in favor of easier and less controversial
alternatives).
141. Many government lawyers enjoy civil-service protections that make their termination difficult.
See, e.g., Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States
Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYST. J. 271, 284 (2002)
(discussing the obstacles to firing assistant U.S. attorneys); see also Lemos & Minzner, supra note 51,
at 888 (“Public sector enforcement lawyers are frequently union members with the protections that
come from negotiated collective bargaining agreements.”); cf. Michaels, supra note 13, at 1031–32
(“Civil-service laws sharply reduce at-will government employment—and, with it, the threat of
termination. The same civil-service safeguards . . . also restrict opportunities for agency heads to
reward industrious workers (through rapid advances or monetary bonuses).” (footnote omitted)).
142. See Patrick McFadden, The First Thing We Do, Let’s Outsource All the Lawyers, 33 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 433, 445 (2004).
143. Pub. L. 99-578 (1986), 100 Stat. 3305 (codified in relevant part at 31 U.S.C. § 3718).
144. Debt Collection Management Staff, Private Counsel Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.
justice.gov/jmd/debt-collection-management-staff#pcp. (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
145. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-94-195, CIVIL DEBT COLLECTION: JUSTICE’S PRIVATE COUNSEL
PILOT PROGRAM SHOULD BE EXPANDED, at 3 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
146. See Recent Rise in Federal Suits to Recover Student Loans, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC) REP. (May 4, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/280 (listing districts
with highest litigation rates); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NATIONWIDE CENTRAL INTAKE FACILITY, BRIEFING
MATERIAL FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES 2 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/dcm/nationwide-central-intakefacility-briefing-material.pdf (listing private counsel districts).
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compensated on a contingency basis: depending on the terms of each contract,
they take home between 19.5% and 35% of the debts they recover in litigation.147 Is the government saving money? According to a 1994 report by the
General Accounting Office (GAO), the answer depends on how costs and
benefits are measured. The GAO found that although private counsel handled
more cases, the participating USAOs collected more total dollars. When costs
were compared to dollars recovered, USAOs looked better: government attorneys collected $38.32 for every $1 estimated in cost, whereas private firms
collected $3.90 for every $1 in cost.148 But the GAO reasoned that a collectionto-cost ratio might be misleading, given that USAOs’ cases tended to be
significantly larger than those handled by private firms. For example, USAOs
reaped more than 60% of their total collections from fourteen cases alone—all
worth more than $1 million—with the biggest private-counsel case weighing in
at $52,667.149 When costs were instead compared to the number of cases
resolved, private firms looked better: the GAO calculated that it cost USAOs an
estimated $421.54 for every case closed compared to $242.58 for every case
that private counsel firms closed.150
Reasonable minds can disagree on the lesson of the debt-collection example.
It is clear, however, that privatization does not automatically produce cost
savings.151 In the litigation context, privatization might fail to deliver the
anticipated savings for a variety of reasons. Private lawyers might charge
exorbitant rates, might not be so expert after all, or might drive up fees with
wasteful work. In theory, competition should ameliorate these problems, at least
in the context of recurring work. But, as in other privatization contexts, competition is not a given when it comes to doling out the government’s legal work.
2. Obstacles: Cronyism, Politics, and Inadequate Competition
Concerns about inefficient outsourcing have been brought to the fore by
reports suggesting that state attorneys general and other government officials
have awarded lucrative contracts to firms that have contributed large sums to
their campaigns. For example, during the multistate tobacco litigation, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore selected his largest campaign donor to
represent the state for a contingent fee, while Texas Attorney General Dan
Morales chose five firms, four of which had contributed to Morales’s campaign.152 (Morales was later indicted for trying to secure unearned legal fees for
147. See GAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 16.
148. Id. at 15. Those figures overstate what USAOs’ costs would look like absent privatization
because current costs include the cost of supervising private counsel.
149. Id. at 19. The cases referred to private counsel had, on average, 10% of the value of the cases
controlled by USAOs.
150. Id. at 15–16.
151. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 57–78 (surveying the (mixed) empirical evidence on the
efficiency of privatization).
152. See Carolyn Lochhead, The Growing Power of Trial Lawyers, WEEKLY STANDARD, Sept. 23,
1996, at 21, 22–23.
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another lawyer involved in the litigation.)153 More recently, Louisiana Attorney
General Buddy Caldwell drew fire in the media after it was revealed that he had
paid $27 million in hourly fees to thirteen law firms that had given a combined
$277,000 to his campaigns, including firms of Caldwell’s campaign chief and
treasurer.154
“Pay to play” arrangements present obvious problems, not least of which is
the absence of any meaningful competition. Studies of privatization elsewhere
demonstrate that, without real competition, contracting with private firms tends
to be at least as expensive as relying on government employees to perform the
work in question.155 So too in litigation: a lack of competition risks saddling
government with excessive fees and underqualified attorneys. Not only might
government officials overlook private firms that could have done the work for
less, but a temptation to award contracts to contributors and cronies might lead
officials to outsource litigation work that could and should be performed
in-house.
The federal government and some states have instituted reforms designed to
combat cronyism in the award of government litigation work by requiring
officials to select private firms via open and transparent bidding systems.156 A
Florida statute, for example, requires the attorney general to make a written
determination that any contingent-fee representation “is both cost-effective and
in the public interest,” to request proposals from private attorneys, and to
publicize the resulting contract.157 The statute also imposes caps on the percentage
and total amount of contingent fees. The Florida statute has served as a model
for similar legislation in at least five other states158 and some attorneys general

153. See R.G. Ratcliffe & Clay Robison, Morales Indicted on 12 Charges: Ex-Attorney General
Accused of Defrauding State in Tobacco Suit, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 7, 2003, at A1.
154. David Hammer, Attorney General Called Out for Giving Contracts to Top Campaign Donors,
WWLTV EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:25 AM), http://www.wwltv.com/story/news/local/
investigations/david-hammer/2014/09/03/14591396/.
155. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 78 (“Public versus private matters, but competitive versus
noncompetitive usually matters more. . . . [H]alf of a market system—profit drive without meaningful
specifications or competitive discipline—can be worse than none.” (emphasis in original)).
156. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 7.6 (1983) (barring private attorneys and firms from
accepting government legal work if they made or solicited political contributions “for the purpose of
obtaining” the business). But see Coffee, supra note 22, at 245 (noting that “the evidence suggests that
state bar groups are steering clear of the ABA’s new ethical rule on ‘pay-to-play’ practices”).
157. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.0155 (West 2015).
158. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-4803 (2012); IND. CODE § 4-6-3-2.5(b) (2012); IOWA CODE
§§ 13.7, 23B.3 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 7-5-8, 7-5-21, 7-5-39 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 34.376,
34.378, 34.380 (2015); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-304(1)(a)(III) (2015) (capping the effective
hourly rate of contingent-fee attorneys at $1,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-37,135(a)(1) (2014) (establishing elaborate procedures for contracts that might result in the payment of more than $1,000,000 in fees
to private attorneys); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-12-08.1 (2015) (providing that attorney general may not
enter into contingent-fee arrangements in cases worth more than $150,000 without approval from
emergency commission); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2254.103(e) (2013) (requiring legislative approval
for most contingent-fee arrangements); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-510.1 (2015) (requiring open and
competitive bidding for contingent-fee contracts).

544

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 104:515

have issued administrative orders implementing equivalent requirements.159
Though such reforms are a move in the right direction, they do not themselves ensure that outsourcing will be cost-effective. To begin with, most of the
state statutes are limited to contingent-fee arrangements, ignoring the potential
for analogous problems under hourly or flat fees. More fundamentally, avoiding
cronyism is only a first step toward an efficient system of privatization, which
requires actual competition, not just the absence of collusion. To return to the
debt-collection example, the GAO reported that DOJ had awarded contracts to
every firm that submitted a proposal in the first three pilot districts. The reason
is simple: DOJ was under a mandate from Congress to make best efforts to
contract with at least four firms in each pilot district, but received qualified
proposals from only three firms in each district.160 An absence of meaningful
competition might explain why DOJ pays private counsel contingent fees
ranging up to 35%. Thirty-five percent is slightly above the norm in the market
for contingent fees and is justified by the risk that the attorney will devote
significant resources to the case only to lose, earning nothing at all.161 But,
unlike the typical contingent-fee case, there is virtually no risk of loss for DOJ’s
contractors. Most cases settle quickly, or the debtor defaults. And private firms
have thousands of cases from which to choose: if one case looks risky, the firm
can easily move on to the next. Thus, the conventional justifications for
generous contingent fees have little force in this context.
The debt-collection example also suggests some of the more subtle political
forces that may stand in the way of clear-headed assessments of the relative
merits of outsourcing.162 Recall that the Amendments were enacted in 1986—
during the early, heady years of privatization. For legislators committed to
shrinking government, devoting additional funds to DOJ may not have been a
viable option. Clouding matters further, the costs of contingent-fee lawyers like

159. See, e.g., Samuel S. Olens, Ga. Att’y Gen., Administrative Order, May 29, 2012 (regarding the
hiring of outside counsel on a contingency-fee basis); Patrick Morrisey, W. Va. Att’y Gen., Outside
Counsel Policy, July 16, 2013 (same).
160. GAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 6, 8. Although the report is not explicit on this point, it seems
that similar patterns may have occurred in the later-added districts. As of 1992, DOJ had contracted
with twenty-five firms in seven districts, with only one district meeting the “at least four” threshold.
GAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 2, tbl.1.
161. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox, 65
STAN. L. REV. 633, 667 n.188 (2013) (reporting that contingency fees have remained steady at 33% for
several decades); see also Dana, supra note 22, at 318 n.3 (“The classic justification for the allocation
of a relatively high percentage of recovery to lawyers, typically one-third, is that tort litigation entails
risk of loss and hence the risk that the lawyers will be left with nothing in the hole. To compensate for
that downside risk, plaintiffs’ lawyers need the upside incentive of a substantial share of any tort
proceeds, even though that share may well exceed what would have been paid to well-compensated
lawyers on a standard hourly basis.”).
162. See DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 13 (“Unless we are luckier or more careful than we are likely to
be, political pressures will tend to retain for the public sector functions where privatization would make
sense, and to privatize tasks that would be better left to government.”); Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291–95 (2003) (describing the ideological
overtones common in debates over privatization).
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those in the private counsel program are less transparent than the costs of
government employees. Because the private attorneys are compensated with a
portion of the debts they collect, it is possible to squint at the program and see
more money coming in at zero cost to taxpayers. That view is mistaken, of
course—every dollar paid to a private attorney is a dollar that is not deposited
into the general treasury—but it may be easy for politicians to blink that reality
when faced with a choice between devoting more tax dollars to DOJ’s budget
and paying private attorneys off the books.
Government officials who anticipate a limited time in office may also find it
all too easy to focus on the immediate advantages of outsourcing while ignoring
the bigger picture. For example, Idaho has paid private attorneys more than $30
million over the past three years in order to supplement the limited staff of the
Attorney General’s Office.163 Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter explained: “You’ve
got to find a happy medium with what you know you need, and maintain that
and supplement it. . . . I like to know that when we don’t need them, we don’t
have to pay them.”164 Though the idea of turning to private counsel to handle
temporary spikes in litigation work makes sense in theory, the volume of
Idaho’s outsourcing suggests reason to doubt the state has struck a happy
medium in fact. Given that the annual outlay for outside counsel represents
more than half the Attorney General’s budget, it seems unlikely that the state’s
need for additional manpower will suddenly dry up.165 And the cost of such
repeated outsourcing may be substantial, measured not only in wasted tax
revenue but also in the decreased capacity of the Attorney General’s Office.
Nevertheless, each contract may seem entirely sensible (even necessary) if
viewed in isolation—and government officials have little incentive to gather the
data necessary to fill out the picture.
Finally, even if government officials take care at the front end to measure the
projected costs of outsourcing, they may also need to supervise the work of
private attorneys to ensure that privatization is cost-effective in practice. As
students of the legal-services market have long recognized, attorneys have both
motive and means to maximize their fees at the expense of clients. Attorneys
who are paid by the hour have incentives to “run the meter,” driving up costs by
performing unnecessary work.166 Flat fees avoid that problem but encourage

163. See Rebecca Boone & John Miller, Idaho Spends Millions on Outside Attorneys, MAGICVALLEY.COM (TIMES-NEWS) (Feb. 17, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://magicvalley.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/idahospends-millions-on-outside-attorneys/article_01e10e30-9825-11e3-b2d5-001a4bcf887a.html.
164. Id.
165. Similarly, some state attorneys general hire private contingent-fee attorneys with such frequency that they could almost certainly support a full-time employee (or several) with the fees such
attorneys are paid. For example, the website of Mississippi AG Jim Hood lists forty-nine “active
contingency fee cases.” See Outside Legal Counsel, OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN. STATE OF MISS., http://www.ago.
state.ms.us/outside-legal (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
166. See Wilkins, supra note 79, at 452. Cf. Joel F. Henning, Law Firms and Legal Departments:
Can’t We All Get Along?, 7 BUS. L. TODAY, Aug. 1998, at 24, 28 (“In a recent survey, more than
one-third of outside counsel admitted that the prospect of billing additional hours at least sometimes
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shirking.167 Contingent-fee arrangements create incentives for lawyers to settle
claims quickly, so as to avoid the risk and expense of more protracted proceedings.168 All of these practices increase the cost (or reduce the value) of private
lawyers’ services.
Supervision by government employees might ameliorate these problems
somewhat, and some states have adopted supervision requirements via statutes
and/or judicial decisions.169 (Again, those rules tend to focus predominantly on
contingent-fee arrangements.) Similar requirements exist at the federal level by
virtue of rules that prohibit outsourcing inherently governmental functions.170
Supervision is not a panacea, to be sure; I argue below that the promise of
meaningful supervision may often be illusory. But when the concern is the
financial bottom line—hours clocked, dollars billed, and so on—oversight
seems possible and can help the government police against overcharging.171 The
harder question is whether government attorneys can superintend the day-to-day
details of private attorneys’ work, looking beyond cost to how they handle
litigation in the government’s name. The next section takes up that question.
B. ARE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAWYERS FUNGIBLE?

The discussion so far suggests reasons for skepticism about the supposed
financial benefits of privatization. But private provision might change more than
the price of government litigation; it might change the litigation itself. Government attorneys enjoy vast discretion, both as to the ends sought by litigation and
the means used to achieve them. Government attorneys cannot (and should not)
go after every apparent violation of the law. They must choose their battles. As
Justice Jackson put it during his tenure as Attorney General, “[w]hat every
prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases for prosecution and
to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the

influences their decisions to undertake work that they wouldn’t otherwise have performed . . . .”); Adam
Liptak, Gap Seen Between Court-Appointed Lawyers and Public Defenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/us/13cnd-defenders.html (reporting on study showing that
court-appointed lawyers, who are paid by the hour, impose an additional $5,800 in costs for the system
for every case they handle, as compared to salaried public defenders).
167. Wilkins, supra note 79, at 455; cf. Selmi, supra note 57, at 1442–45 (noting similar concerns
about shirking by salaried government attorneys).
168. See Coffee, supra note 72, at 686–90 (using economic analysis to demonstrate why contingentfee class counsel’s focus on fees may lead to premature settlement).
169. See, e.g., Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 40 (Cal. 2010) (holding that
“contingent-fee agreements between public entities and private counsel must provide . . . that a government attorney with supervisory authority must be personally involved in overseeing the litigation”);
State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 475 (R.I. 2008) (ruling that any contingent-fee arrangement
between attorney general and private counsel must provide that the attorney general “retains absolute
and total control over all critical decision-making” (emphasis omitted)).
170. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
171. That is particularly true with respect to firms that hope to secure future work. The prospect of
repeat play allows government to leverage competition, not only at the initial point of contracting, but
throughout the arrangement.
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greatest, and the proof the most certain.”172 Jackson was referring to prosecutorial discretion, but the necessity—and desirability—of discretion extends to the
civil sphere as well. Many laws are written in broad and general terms that, if
taken literally, could embrace a range of benign activities. We rely on public
attorneys and officials to exercise their discretion in ways that focus on the
law’s core targets, ignoring violations that fall outside the principal purposes of
the law. Indeed, this has long been considered one of the key differences
between public and private litigation. Unlike private litigants and lawyers, who
can be expected to pursue any litigation that serves their self-interest, governmental entities and their attorneys are supposed to prioritize initiatives that best
serve the public interest.173
Defensive litigation entails similar discretionary choices. The point is captured vividly in recent high-profile decisions by government attorneys not to
defend certain state and federal laws against constitutional challenges.174 Yet
even run-of-the-mill cases require government defendants to determine whether
the public interest would be served by an aggressive defense or the equivalent
of a confession of error.175
Those discretionary choices are all the more important in a world of vanishing trials, where the overwhelming majority of cases settle (or, in the criminal
sphere, plead out).176 Settlements are at the heart of critiques of so-called
regulation-by-litigation, whereby government litigators use negotiated settlements in enforcement actions to impose new substantive requirements on
regulated entities.177 Of course, regulation-by-litigation need not be a pejorative
term: many commentators celebrate government’s ability to promote regulatory
values via litigation. The important point for present purposes is that, as a
practical matter, the outcome of government litigation often will be determined,

172. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940).
173. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, STATEMENT OF THE ATT’Y GEN. ON LITIGATION
INVOLVING THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (2011) (announcing that DOJ will not defend the constitutionality of aspects of the Defense of Marriage Act); Niraj Chokshi, Seven Attorneys General Won’t Defend
Their Own State’s Gay-Marriage Bans, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/02/20/six-attorneys-general-wont-defend-their-own-states-gay-marriage-bans.
175. See Neil M. Peretz, The Limits of Outsourcing: Ethical Responsibilities of Federal Government
Attorneys Advising Executive Branch Officials, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 23, 30 (2006) (recording one
court’s suggestion that government attorneys ask of each claim, “[i]s opposing this claim just, is it fair,
is there a reasonable basis for believing that the government can prevail on both the law and facts?”).
176. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461, 483 (2004); John H. Langbein, The
Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 522 (2012); cf. GEORGE FISHER,
PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 17 (2003) (describing the
“triumph” of plea bargaining and noting that “the prosecutor, who always had the strongest interest in
plea bargaining, now has almost unilateral power to deal”).
177. See Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 204–05
(2005) (“Regulation-by-litigation . . . requires settlement as an element. Settlement is critical because . . . ‘it is the nature of a settlement to sublimate questions of right and duty and to silence further
consideration of the merits or the policies advanced by the agreed result.’”).
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not by a court, but by government litigators themselves.178
Privatizing the performance of public litigation means relying on private
actors to exercise discretion in the name of the government.179 But private
attorneys have different incentives, and may be accustomed to different norms,
than their counterparts in public service. Thus, hiring private attorneys to do the
government’s work might provoke a subtle shift in the conduct and focus of
public litigation.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between public and private attorneys
concerns financial motivations—a point that critics have used to challenge
states’ reliance on private lawyers who work for contingent fees. Contingent-fee
lawyers, so the argument goes, seek only to maximize their fees, whereas public
lawyers “should work to maximize the public interest.”180 It is easy to imagine
instances in which those interests might diverge. For example, in a case where
the public interest would be best served by nonmonetary relief, one might worry
that a lawyer working for a contingent fee would focus on boosting damages
rather than crafting an effective injunctive remedy.181 Critics argue, therefore,
that substituting contingent-fee lawyers for civil servants threatens to steer
government litigation off its normal path and away from the public interest.182
That challenge captures an important intuition, but it is both too broad and
too narrow in its conventional telling. In some respects, the argument overstates
the effects of privatization. The states’ critics assume that contingent-fee lawyers emphasize fees to the exclusion of all else—ignoring that many private
lawyers, including those who work on a contingency basis, have strong ideological commitments to the causes they pursue.183 Meanwhile, critics overlook that
public attorneys may have their own reasons for maximizing financial rewards.
Large recoveries are easy to measure and to publicize to voters, superiors, and

178. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of
Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 272 (2013) (“[F]ederal prosecutors . . . have almost unlimited and unreviewable power to select the charges that will be brought against defendants. . . . Prosecutors’ selection of
charges and their decision whether to file a motion for a sentencing departure typically dictate a
defendant’s sentence as well.”).
179. Cf. Metzger, supra note 13, at 1395 (arguing that “delegations of discretion are unavoidable [in
most cases of privatization] because the power to implement and apply rules is inseparable from the
power to set policy”).
180. Wilkins, supra note 79, at 436.
181. See Robert S. Khuzami & George S. Canellos, Opinion, Unfair Claims, Untenable Solution:
Professor John Coffee Does Not Do the SEC’s Enforcement Record Justice, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 14, 2013, at
34, 34 (criticizing proposal that SEC hire private lawyers on a contingent-fee basis because “that
solution assumes that the SEC’s general goal is to sue as many deep-pocketed parties, and collect as
much in penalties, as possible. But, as enforcer of the nation’s securities laws, the SEC’s goal is
aggressively to uphold the law and serve the interests of justice”).
182. See Dana, supra note 22, at 323–28.
183. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2087, 2096–97
(2004) (“Just as lawyers in ‘public interest’ litigation explain their involvement in terms of commitment
to the cause, similar explanations often can be heard from plaintiffs’ lawyers in mass tort litigation,
focusing on their contribution to the public good. . . . [S]ome of the rhetoric is backed up by litigation
decisions that suggest genuine commitment to the policy objectives.”).
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legislative overseers. It is far more difficult to convey the importance or the
scale of injunctive remedies. Government litigators anxious to develop reputations as strong enforcers therefore have good cause to concentrate their efforts
on monetary recoveries.184 Similar incentives are created by institutional arrangements that allow public enforcement agencies to retain a portion of any financial
awards, or fees, that they win.185 Such arrangements can and do exist in the
absence of privatization, but contingent-fee agreements with private counsel
create new opportunities for revenue building. Some contracts between state
attorneys general and private lawyers provide for contingent fees, not only for
the private counsel but also for the government. In South Carolina, for example,
the attorney general regularly retains 10% of the fees that otherwise would be
allocated to private counsel.186 Privatization may be to blame if such arrangements encourage states to maximize financial recoveries, but the blame must be
shared with other institutional structures that create similar tendencies.
In other respects, a focus on the financial incentives of contingent-fee lawyers
understates the effects of privatization. Regardless of their fee arrangements
with the government, private lawyers may focus on maximizing financial
recoveries simply because that is what they are accustomed to doing for private
clients. Competition, considered a key to cost-effective outsourcing, may reinforce that pattern. Private lawyers who wish to secure future government
contracts have strong incentives to focus on easily quantifiable measures of
success—and dollars recovered may well be the most promising metric.
More broadly—and again regardless of their fee arrangements with the
government—private attorneys may have different instincts about how to frame
claims and arguments than their counterparts in the public sector. For example,
Howard Erichson has described the efforts by several jurisdictions to use
litigation against gun manufacturers to combat gun violence. New Orleans and
other jurisdictions hired private lawyers to handle the work in exchange for
contingent fees, whereas Chicago relied on its own lawyers to develop a theory
of the case. Erichson explains that the difference in lawyers was reflected in the
way the respective cities’ claims were framed and presented:
Private lawyers naturally bring a mass tort/product liability orientation, whereas
public lawyers are more likely to bring a law enforcement orientation. The
[private attorneys’] complaints in New Orleans and other cities relied largely
on traditional product liability theories and focused upon handguns as defective products based on missing safety features. . . . [T]he approach mirrored
what might have been asserted in an individual tort lawsuit or in a class action
brought by handgun victims. Chicago’s complaint, by contrast, relied on a

184. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 51, at 875–86.
185. Id. at 864–75.
186. See Contingency Fee Litigation Retention Agreements, S. C. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.scag.gov/
litigation-retention-agreements (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (citing to examples of agreements providing
the 10% retention fee).
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public nuisance theory and focused largely on the handgun industry’s methods
of distribution. . . . Whereas the New Orleans complaint looks like a mass tort
case, the Chicago complaint resonates with the language of law enforcement.187

As Erichson’s example suggests, private lawyers may bring to government
work habits formed in service of private clients. In the firearms cases, private
lawyers framed government claims in the same way they would have framed
private claims. Products liability theories not only are readily available to
private claimants, but they also are likely to generate substantial damages.
Perhaps the lawyers focused on lucrative theories in hope of maximizing fees.
But an additional possibility is they wrote what they knew, so to speak, relying
on theories that were familiar to them—because they would be attractive to
their clients—in private practice.
The idea that aspects of lawyering may be habitual suggests a still broader
point, and a call for caution, about outsourcing public litigation. Lawyers can
shape the conduct of litigation in myriad ways, ranging well beyond the
headline questions of what claims to assert and what relief to pursue. Take, for
example, the question of discovery: civil litigants must comply with various
disclosure requirements, but the state and federal rules of procedure leave ample
room for both facilitative and obstructive approaches to the exchange of information.188 The same is true in criminal cases. Government is obligated to turn over
certain information to the defense, but prosecutors’ offices vary widely in their
approaches. Some follow “open file” policies that exceed legal requirements,
while others are far more stingy with disclosures.189
Similar points could be made with respect to countless other aspects of
litigation, including motion practice, the handling of witnesses in depositions
and trial testimony, briefing, and so on. In short, the rules governing litigation
practice are capacious enough to permit a wide range of attorney conduct.
Through their decisions on the day-to-day details of legal work, lawyers have
enormous power to transform the litigation process into something aggressively
adversarial or cordial and cooperative. They can “play hardball” or “seek
justice;” act like “junkyard dogs” or “officers of the court.”
Importantly for present purposes, those decisions can have profound effects
on opposing parties. Research in social psychology suggests that parties’ assessments of the legitimacy of the law, and of legal authority more generally, are

187. Erichson, supra note 131, at 138, 147–48.
188. See Kimberly Kirkland, The Ethics of Constructing Truth: The Corporate Litigator’s Approach,
in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 152, 157, 159 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn
Mather eds., 2012) (“Most corporate litigators report that they generally read discovery requests
narrowly, thereby reducing the universe of ‘responsive’ documents . . . . [C]orporate litigators view
evasive responses to document requests as acceptable—as merely part of the ‘game’ of complex and
high-stakes litigation.”).
189. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE, supra note 188, at 269, 279–80.
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informed by their perceptions of the fairness of legal processes.190 Most of the
research focuses on how parties are treated by authority figures—primarily
judges, but also police officers, arbitrators, and so on.191 Although some work
investigates the importance of the relationship between parties and their own
attorneys,192 less attention has been devoted to the influence that opposing
counsel might have on parties’ perceptions of procedural justice.193 However,
the available evidence (consisting largely of studies of negotiations and mediations where there is no central authority figure) suggests that opposing parties
and lawyers do matter.194 That finding is hardly surprising in light of the
emphasis that procedural-justice theories place on factors such as parties’ ability
to exercise voice and be heard in a meaningful way, and the degree to which
they were treated with dignity and respect. Attorneys have ample opportunities
to influence the tenor of proceedings in ways that might promote those values—or undermine them, as the case may be.195
When the opposing party is the government, moreover, the line between
party/attorney and authority is, at best, blurred. Particularly when the government litigates against a private party in a sovereign capacity to enforce or
defend its laws, it is “itself in authority.”196 The government brings the full
machinery of the state to bear against the opposing party. It represents the same
sovereign that supplies the court system, the same sovereign that will enforce
the eventual judgment. If citizens’ perceptions of the law’s legitimacy are
influenced by the conduct of the authority figures they confront in the legal
process, the conduct of government attorneys—or private attorneys who stand

190. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 70 (1988)
(reporting on research showing connections between citizens’ positive perceptions of procedural justice
and their evaluation of legal outcomes and their “greater overall satisfaction with the legal experience
and more positive affect with respect to an encounter with the justice system”).
191. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 137–38 (2011) (summarizing the state of the field).
192. See William L. F. Felstiner & Ben Pettit, Paternalism, Power, and Respect in Lawyer–Client
Relations, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 135, 139 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds.,
2001); see also Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 483,
498 (1988).
193. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 191, at 146 (“The role of lawyers has been relatively understudied in empirical procedural justice research.”).
194. For example, parties reported greater satisfaction with mediations when the attorneys behaved
in a cooperative manner. See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo et al., Institutionalization: What Do Empirical
Studies Tell Us About Court Mediation?, 9 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 8, 10 (2003); see also Hollander-Blumoff,
supra note 191, at 160 (“Although attorneys are not decisionmakers themselves, they are nonetheless in
a position of some status in a court proceeding and their behavior may affect the procedural justice
perceptions both of the other attorneys involved in the action and of the litigants themselves.”).
195. For an argument that prosecutors’ behavior can enhance (or undermine, with “high-handed”
tactics) the perceived procedural fairness of plea bargaining, see Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining
and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 415–19 (2008).
196. DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 173
(2008) (“The government . . . is not an ordinary disputant who confronts the authority of the state
(through litigation or in some other way) but is, rather, itself in authority.”) (emphasis in original).
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in the shoes of the government—would seem to be a factor in that calculus.197
All of this suggests that, when assessing government litigation, we ought to
look beyond ends—whether cases are won or lost, or what relief was obtained—
and consider means as well. But as we shift our focus from the outcome of
government litigation to its conduct, the privatization analysis becomes increasingly complicated. The literature on privatization makes clear that outsourcing
may be particularly problematic in areas where the principal cares about means
as well as ends, and where it is difficult to specify in advance the hallmarks of a
job well done.198 The problem stems from the limitations of contracting.
Although a contract with private lawyers may prescribe certain guidelines—
perhaps requiring private attorneys to comply with the office’s policies with
respect to particular matters—it is difficult at best to anticipate and resolve
every question in advance. In practice, guidelines tend to be cast at a fairly high
level of generality, leaving unresolved countless questions that may come up in
the course of any given litigation.199
Not surprisingly, then, studies suggest that informal institutional norms may
be more important than formal policies in shaping attorneys’ conduct.200 Lawyers learn what is expected of them via a host of contextual cues, including
interactions with coworkers and supervisors, plaudits given or withheld, habits
gleaned from shared work product, and so on.201 Such nuances of institutional
culture may be difficult to convey to outside contractors who work for the
government on a temporary basis.
That is not to say that acculturation is unthinkable: it may be possible to
remake every private lawyer into a government lawyer (effectively, if not
formally).202 But acculturation takes time, and it may be harder than we
197. Government attorneys sometimes acknowledge as much. For example, a study of local prosecutors reported that “[o]ne chief prosecutor said that he told his assistants: ‘If we don’t do our jobs in a
manner that is ethically appropriate, then the longer term consequence is that people don’t trust you.”
Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 189, at 276.
198. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 13, at 79–83.
199. See Beale, supra note 64, at 136 (“Although prosecutorial guidelines are increasingly common,
in many cases the guidelines are stated in such general terms that they do not provide clear standards in
individual cases.”).
200. See, e.g., Kirkland, supra note 188, at 164 (“[C]orporate lawyers learn to identify and follow
relevant ‘practice norms.’ Practice norms are the unwritten rules that govern their approaches to
litigation . . . .”); Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 189, at 280–81, 286 (“Informal socialization
through ongoing discussion with other prosecutors and supervisors ultimately appears to have a greater
effect on prosecutors’ resolution of disclosure questions [than formal policies and training].”); see also
Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1131,
1134 (2012) (explaining that “explicit policies in state prosecutors’ offices form only a thin visible crust
on a deep set of office structures that shape or reinforce attorney identity” and describing links between
prosecutors’ role orientation and their professional conduct).
201. See Levine & Wright, supra note 200, at 1122 (“In addition to understanding the official
policies, new prosecutors must discover the unwritten social rules, norms, and language of the
profession and of their offices. Newcomers learn these expectations informally, whether through
lunchtime chats or through careful observation of how veterans behave and speak.”).
202. In addition to the limitations described in the text, there is also a question whether government
entities would want to transform private lawyers into the equivalents of government employees. As Jon
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think.203 Research on “[o]rganizational socialization”—the “process by which
an individual comes to appreciate the values, abilities, expected behaviors, and
social knowledge essential for assuming an organizational role and for participating as an organizational member”—indicates that the initial experience of
acculturation in any new job can take months and “is characterized by disorientation, foreignness, and a kind of sensory overload.”204
Any meaningful process of acculturation also would require far more oversight than the formal reservation of decisional authority required by law.205 It
can be challenging, however, for government attorneys to keep up with the
details of work performed by private counsel—particularly when the justification for privatization is that the private attorneys posses specialized expertise
that the public attorneys lack.206 Even in more routine cases, anecdotal evidence
suggests that requirements of meaningful supervision are ineffectual.207 (They
are also extremely difficult to enforce, given attorney-client and work-product
protections.) In the debt-collection context, for example, DOJ tasks one Assistant U.S. Attorney to oversee the work of the multiple firms working in each
private counsel district. The numbers are daunting: the GAO’s report indicates
that, over the first four years of the private counsel program, DOJ referred a
total of 25,519 cases to private firms in seven districts—suggesting something
in the range of 900 cases per district, per year.208 While supervising attorneys
may be capable of maintaining a spreadsheet tracking cases resolved, dollars
collected, and fees paid out, it is fanciful to suggest that a single government
attorney can provide meaningful oversight for 900 additional private-counsel
cases while keeping up with her own workload.
Even where it is feasible, supervision may itself be costly. At some point,
extensive oversight of private attorneys will consume all the resources that

Michaels has detailed, government often uses privatization to exploit the differences between civil
servants and private contractors. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
717, 745–50 (2010) (describing privatization as a means of transferring “decisionmaking input . . . from
the politically insulated bureaucrats to potentially more responsive contractors”).
203. See generally John Van Maanen & Edgar H. Schein, Toward a Theory of Organizational
Socialization, 1 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 209 (1979) (exploring the challenges of socializing
newcomers into new organizations or roles).
204. Meryl Reis Louis, Surprise and Sense Making: What Newcomers Experience in Entering
Unfamiliar Organizational Settings, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 226, 229–31 (1980).
205. See supra notes 83–88, 98–99 and accompanying text.
206. Cf. Freeman, supra note 162, at 1317 (noting that governmental agencies are “generally
ill-equipped” to “extensive[ly] monitor[] . . . private contractors . . . for quality control, which these
agencies charged with oversight have traditionally not done very effectively”).
207. See, e.g., Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway, 947 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747, 748 (E.D. Ky.
2013) (rejecting a challenge to the State’s reliance on a private firm notwithstanding the supervising
assistant attorney general’s “unfamiliarity” with aspects of the case, reasoning that “the AG’s office
does not need to be intimately involved in all of the everyday work or decision-making that occurs in
the . . . litigation to exercise meaningful control over the proceedings”).
208. GAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 10, tbl.3.
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outsourcing was intended to save.209 Yet the alternative—using lawyers who
may be accustomed to different norms of practice—carries costs of a different
kind.
Consider a case from California, in which Governor Gray Davis hired private
attorneys to defend the state against charges that it had failed to provide basic
educational necessities to public school children. The case made news—and not
in a good way—when reports emerged that the state’s defense team had taken a
heavy hand in depositions. The San Francisco Chronicle ran an article titled
“High-priced legal team browbeats youths about shoddy schools”:
For 24 days this summer, high-priced attorneys from a politically connected
law firm grilled 13 witnesses, trying to topple their testimony . . . . The
lawyers . . . exhaustively combed through each claim. Some witnesses cried.
Others became frightened when the questioning took on the tone of an
interrogation. And some were defiant, angry at suggestions that they had lied
or exaggerated. The witnesses ranged in age from 8 to 17.210

Of course, it is impossible to know whether government attorneys would
have behaved any differently in the California schools case, or any other. The
point here is not that public and private lawyers are different in some essential,
immutable way. Rather, like other workers, their professional habits are shaped
by the contexts in which they work—and those contexts may vary from
government to private practice.
It bears emphasis that this is a point of caution, not condemnation. Many
private firms take pains to cultivate the highest standards of ethical behavior in
their employees, believing that their reputations will win them credibility in the
courts and, thus, clients. And, as noted above, government offices themselves
may differ starkly in their internal norms and cultures. In some cases, private
lawyers may raise the bar for attorney conduct above what government would
have generated in-house.
Indeed, there may be an independent value to dislodging the settled norms of
government litigators. One of the potential benefits of outsourcing is that private
contractors can bring new perspectives to government work, spurring innovations that would not have occurred if the doors between public and private had
remained closed. In the litigation context, private lawyers may help correct for

209. Letter from Arnold I. Burns, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the Hon. Marshall J.
Breger, Chairman, Admin. Conference of the U.S. 4 (Nov. 10, 1986) (on file with author) (“Attorneys
without experience in representing the government, and without day-to-day supervision by experienced
government officials, would be unfamiliar with the special problems of public practice and the special
standards of conduct to which government attorneys are generally held. Conversely, for the Department
to expend substantial resources necessary adequately to supervise private counsel . . . would almost
certainly make the retention of private attorneys uneconomical and impractical.”).
210. Nanette Asimov & Lance Williams, Gov. Davis vs. Schoolkids / High-Priced Legal Team
Browbeats Youths About Shoddy Schools, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 2, 2001), http://www.sfgate.com/education/
article/Gov-Davis-vs-schoolkids-High-priced-legal-2883621.php.

2016]

PRIVATIZING PUBLIC LITIGATION

555

“tunnel vision” on behalf of government litigators, who may be accustomed to
seeing only one side of their cases and blind to the opposing considerations.211
The notion of cross-pollination between the public and private spheres suggests a final caveat. Today’s legal profession is extraordinarily mobile, and it is
not uncommon for attorneys to move in and out of government practice.212 This
mobility suggests both that lawyers are capable of internalizing the norms of
new institutions fairly quickly, and that many private attorneys may already
have substantial experience in government work. Still, there are meaningful
differences between full-time government employees and attorneys who perform the public’s work while maintaining private practices. As David Wilkins
has observed, lawyers in the latter position “will continue to represent private
clients at the same time that they are doing the people’s work—and if the
lawyer herself does not, then other members of her firm surely will.”213 Wilkins
points out that “[t]his duality creates a significant potential for conflicts of
interest.”214 But it also complicates any effort on the part of the private attorney
to adopt the norms of government practice on a temporary basis.215
In sum, outsourcing government litigation holds undeniable promise in terms
of cost savings. In some instances it may not only be sensible, it may be
necessary. But lawyers are not widgets, and when governments rely on private
attorneys to litigate on their behalf, they may not be getting the same product at
a lower cost. They may be getting a different kind of lawyer, a different kind of
litigation.
There is a tension, moreover, between the goal of cost saving and the need for
training and close supervision to ensure that private lawyers embrace the norms
of government practice. Outsourcing government litigation is easiest to defend
in financial terms where it is sporadic rather than routine, used to fill short-term
needs for manpower or specialized expertise. But those instances also pose the
greatest difficulties for acculturation. By contrast, the costs of acculturation
might be minimized by what the literature on corporate counsel calls “convergence”—a reference to efforts by in-house counsel to reduce the number of
outside firms on their “approved lists,” so as to “establish closer inside/outside
relationships, to ‘partner’ with outside providers.”216 Among other advantages,
convergence allows in-house counsel to keep closer tabs on outside counsel and

211. See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW.
L.J. 475, 485–87 (2006).
212. A nationwide survey of legal careers conducted in 2007 found that almost half of the surveyed
lawyers who were working in the federal government, and 37% of those working in state or local
government, had been in different practice settings in 2003. RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II:
SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 54–55 (2009).
213. Wilkins, supra note 79, at 456–56.
214. Id. at 457.
215. Cf. Louis, supra note 204, at 231 (noting that most instances of organizational socialization
involve not only “changing to” a new role, but “changing from” one’s old situation, and that research
suggests the difficulty of accomplishing one without the other).
216. SMITH, supra note 135, at 173.
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to impress on them the norms of the client corporation.217 We can imagine
similar ongoing partnerships between government litigators and private firms.
But despite its benefits in terms of acculturation, convergence runs counter to
the goal of ongoing competition among private firms, and therefore is likely to
raise the financial costs of outsourcing.218
III. PRIVATE FINANCING OF PUBLIC LITIGATION
The discussion so far has focused on who handles litigation in the name of
the government. But, as we saw in Part I, the choice between public and private
extends beyond the delivery of public goods; it also concerns how we pay for
them. Just as we might rely on private actors to perform tasks that once were
done by government employees, we can (and often do) privatize funding by
moving from a system of collective tax payments to one in which individuals
pay for the services they want. Some public parks are supported by taxes and
free to users, for example; others charge an entrance fee.
In the world of litigation, performance and payment tend to go hand in hand.
The coupling of performance and payment is not inevitable, however. As Part I
described, private dollars are fueling public litigation in areas ranging from
criminal prosecutions to constitutional challenges to federal law. If anything, we
can expect private financing to expand in scope as state and local jurisdictions
grapple with persistent budget limitations. This Part explores the costs and
benefits of private financing.
A. HOW SHOULD WE PAY FOR GOVERNMENT LITIGATION?
There are a variety of reasons why governments might prefer public funding
over private payments. Some of those reasons are moral or philosophical,
reflecting a view that certain goods and services are too fundamental to be
allocated according to individuals’ willingness and ability to pay. Other reasons
are economic, reflecting a judgment that the good or service in question would
otherwise be underproduced due to some form of market failure.
Both concerns are reflected in debates over user fees and other means of
financing public services individually rather than collectively. Like outsourcing,
private funding mechanisms have become more prevalent in recent decades, as
part of the larger push toward privatization.219 The federal government collects
billions of dollars in user fees each year, and several agencies are funded

217. Id. at 174.
218. Cf. SCLAR, supra note 13, at 14 (“The longer the term of the contract and the more complex the
service provided, the smaller the role played by market competition in the costs and benefits of
privatization.”).
219. Marshall J. Berger, Introduction, in ACUS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 19, at 1–2 (describing
increased use of federal user fees during 1980s, and push by Bush Administration “for greater reliance
on user fees”); Thomas Gale Moore, User Fees and Privatization, in ACUS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 19,
at 7 (“[U]ser fees facilitate privatization, which I believe is generally a good idea.”).
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entirely by such fees.220 States, too, rely on fees to pay for a range of
government services.221
The argument in favor of fees is grounded in the same aspirations to
economic efficiency that drive privatization more broadly. By matching benefits
to burdens—ensuring that those who enjoy the fruits of government services
also bear the costs—fees promote efficient use and production of government
services.222 But the system works only where it is possible to extract payments
from those who derive benefits. Where the benefits of government services are
diffuse, extending to the general public and not just those individuals who
directly use the services, user fees will lead citizens to underutilize (and
government to underproduce) beneficial services.223
Thus, one reason to disfavor user fees and other forms of private payment is
that the government service in question generates positive externalities that
cannot be captured in a price that individual users are willing to pay. Put simply,
the market for government services may not work very well. It may deprive the
public of services that we sorely need.
A different objection is that market pricing is inappropriate for some kinds of
services. This objection may take two forms. The first, and most straightforward, sounds in distributive fairness: in a world with severe wealth inequality,
rationing government services according to ability to pay will mean that some
citizens must go without.224 More subtly, one might object to a system of
private payments for government services because of the message it sends about
the nature of those services. For example, there is longstanding disagreement
over whether public parks ought to be funded individually or collectively, by
user fees or by taxes.225 The debate centers on how we should conceive of
220. Peter A. Pfohl, Who Should Pay for Agency Adjudication? A Study of $200,000 Filing Fees at
the Surface Transportation Board, 25 TRANSP. L.J. 57, 71 (1997) (“Almost two hundred billion in user
fees is collected annually by agencies.”).
221. See Reynolds, supra note 19, at 376 (describing “how special assessments, fees, and the
formation of business improvement districts have overtaken general taxation as the preeminent revenue
raising device” in local government).
222. See Moore, supra note 219, at 7 (“User fees . . . are prices . . . . They tell a producer or
producers what to produce and how much to produce. . . . User fees also ration the output. . . . People
then [look at the fee] and decide whether in fact paying that price is worth it for that particular
service.”).
223. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 801–04, 808–09. Suppose, for example, that a
municipality charges residents a fee for each garbage pick-up; it is up to residents to decide how often
to schedule pick-ups and pay the fee. Frequent garbage collection benefits users individually, but it also
benefits the neighborhood collectively—or at least those neighbors who care about cleanliness.
Residents are unlikely to take account of such third-party benefits when deciding how often to use (and
pay for) the service. “Measured from a societal perspective, underuse of the service will likely result.”
Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 809.
224. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 727 (7th ed. 2009) (“If there is a broad social interest in universal availability of a
particular service, the fee might have to be set below the cost of providing the service—or dropped
altogether—to avoid excluding people who cannot otherwise afford to pay.”).
225. See J.M. Bowker et al., User Fees for Recreation Services on Public Lands: A National
Assessment, 17 J. PARK & RECREATION ADMIN. 1, 1–2 (1999) (summarizing the debates).
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public lands. Are outdoor recreation areas simply glorified playgrounds for the
(mostly relatively affluent) individuals who have the inclination and ability to
spend time hiking and sight-seeing? Or should they be understood as aspects of
“America the Beautiful,” parts of our shared national heritage and points of
collective pride and enjoyment? One’s answer to that question will likely shape
one’s view of user fees. User fees imagine the relationship between citizen and
government as one between consumer and seller. A customer-service mentality
might be entirely appropriate, and beneficial, in certain areas. In other areas,
treating government services as if they exist for the benefit of particular
individuals—those who pay for them—might work a pernicious shift in how we
perceive those services, and ultimately how the services are provided.226
Similar considerations help explain why we (usually) finance public litigation
collectively rather than individually. As Part I explained, litigation produces
various public goods, including deterrence and law development. Left to their
own devices, individuals may underinvest in those goods, while overinvesting
in wasteful litigation that generates immediate financial recoveries but minimal
public payoff. If private actors are unlikely to invest in private litigation at
optimal levels, it is even less likely that they would finance public litigation
effectively. Moreover, some forms of litigation might strike most of us as too
important to leave to the vagaries of private decision making. Just as we might
support collective payments for certain basic services, such as medical insurance for the elderly, we might prefer public funding for core aspects of public
litigation. Finally, private payments might send an inappropriate message about
the beneficiaries of government litigation, shifting the focus from public to
private interests.
Criminal prosecutions offer a ready example.227 Though the history of prosecutions in the United States remains murky, it appears that private prosecutions
were common in the colonies, mirroring early English practices.228 The system
“reflected the philosophical view that a crime involved a wrong against an
individual rather than against society as a whole.”229 That model became
difficult to sustain in the face of swelling populations and rising crime rates. In
an effort to combat the “chaos and inefficiency” of private prosecutions, the
226. See Reynolds, supra note 19, at 376 (criticizing funding mechanisms that link public benefits to
private payments and so “exacerbate[] and cement[] [a] dues mentality in the minds of the citizenry”).
227. See Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 249, 269–70 (1998) (“The reason to desire public funding of criminal justice is because it
connotes public control over criminal justice. Public control in turn reflects a deep antipathy toward
entrusting large and important matters to the vagaries and occasional self-interestedness of uninhibited
private initiatives.”).
228. Compare JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 10 (1980)
(“Although the system of private prosecutions prevailed in the English world at the time of the
establishment of the first American colonies . . . it quickly vanished in America.”), with Fairfax, supra
note 95, at 413 (“Up until the late nineteenth century, when the office of the public prosecutor
developed, private lawyers regularly prosecuted criminal cases on behalf of both crime victims and the
state.”).
229. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 9 (2007).
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colonies—and later, states—began to develop the systems of public prosecution
that prevail today.230 The shift was, in part, a response to the realities of the
time: private prosecutions could not maintain public order in the rapidly industrializing society.231 Some victims were too poor to pay for prosecutions. Others
“negotiated private settlements with their offenders, resulting in sporadic, unequal applications of the law.”232 In other cases, no victim could be found,
given the nature of the offense; breaches of the peace are a prime example.233 In
some respects, then, the move to public prosecutions may be understood in
terms of market failure—concerns that private actors lack the will and wherewithal to use the legal system to socially beneficial ends. But the shift to a
public model also reflected a growing recognition that managing crime was a
social, and not just individual, imperative.234 As crime came to be conceived as
a wrong against society as a whole, the logic of vesting prosecutorial authority
in democratically accountable public officials took hold.235
Yet the rise of public prosecutions did not, in itself, strip private individuals
of their influence over the criminal justice system. Many early prosecutors were
paid fees for every case they took to trial.236 Although those fees typically were
drawn from the public treasury, they were linked in some jurisdictions to the
actions of private citizens, who initiated prosecutions by bringing accusations.
Because more cases meant more fees, prosecutors had little incentive to scrutinize accusations for merit.237 As Nicholas Parrillo has described, the upshot was
a “customer-seller relationship between the public prosecutor and private
accusers.”238

230. Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357,
368–69 (1986).
231. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2002) (arguing that “public prosecution evolved from a
private model in a slow, uneven manner in response to fears of social disorder”).
232. DAVIS, supra note 229, at 10.
233. See Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecutions, the
District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 579 (1984) (arguing that the
system of private prosecution declined in Philadelphia “because it was an ineffective means of law
enforcement in the matter of breaches of the public order”).
234. See O’Neill, supra note 116, at 681 (discussing “the trend towards subordinating the interests of
the victim to those of society”).
235. See JACOBY, supra note 228, at 10 (“Private prosecution was inconsistent with the American
concept of democratic process . . . . [T]he American system conceives of the criminal act to be a public
occurrence and of society as a whole the ultimate victim.”); O’Neill, supra note 116, at 678 (emphasizing the “desire to ensure that public prosecutors could be held directly accountable by the people”); see
also Beale, supra note 64, at 52–53 (describing systems of accountability for federal and state
prosecutors); Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528,
1530–36 (2012) (describing the trend toward electing prosecutors).
236. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 259–60 (2013); see also id. at 262–72 (describing alternate payment
systems in which prosecutors were paid fees only for convictions).
237. See id. at 258–62 (describing case-based fee systems, with special emphasis on Philadelphia).
238. Id. at 261.
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This history suggests some of the problems that might follow from a move to
private financing for criminal prosecutions and other forms of public litigation.
But the private financing that concerns us here is not a substitute for collective
tax payments. Instead, it supplements the funds already available to government
litigators via the normal budgeting process. At least at first blush, private gifts in
support of public litigation may seem unproblematic, even desirable. Just as we
might welcome philanthropic donations to support the upkeep of public parks
and national monuments,239 perhaps we should celebrate private donations in
the litigation context. If private dollars can help public attorneys do their jobs, is
that not a good thing?
Despite the surface appeal of private gifts, there are good reasons to be wary
of supplemental funding for public litigation. The following sections argue that
such funding fails to achieve the advantages associated with user fees and other
private payment systems, while recreating many of the problems.
B. PRIVATE PAYMENTS AND EXCESSIVE LITIGATION

Private financing for public litigation is, in essence, a form of “maintenance”—an archaic term that refers to circumstances in which a third party
provides support for litigation in which she has no direct financial interest.
(When funding is provided in exchange for a cut of the winnings—as in
contingent-fee arrangements—the assistance is called champerty, a subset of the
broader category of maintenance.)240 Maintenance was prohibited at common
law, but is now permitted in many U.S. jurisdictions.241 That shift has paved the
way for so-called third-party litigation funding, both ad-hoc and increasingly
organized, as litigation-funding firms with extensive experience overseas expand into the United States.
Although the commentary on third-party litigation funding has focused on
outside funding for private litigation, many of the relevant considerations
translate to the public realm. Proponents argue that third-party litigation funding
“enables liquidity-constrained plaintiffs to bring more cases and to prosecute
cases more effectively. Increased funding for litigation should thus reduce legal
error and help achieve the legal system’s goals, including both compensation
and deterrence of negligent or wrongful acts.”242

239. See Michael E. Ruane, Billionaire Philanthropist Rubenstein to Give Millions to Help Fix
Washington Monument, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/billionairephilanthropist-rubenstein-to-give-millions-to-help-fix-washington-monument/2012/01/18/gIQAPYmb9P_
story.html.
240. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) (defining “maintenance” and “champerty”).
241. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 98–100, 100 n.162, 107 &
n.190 (2011) (reporting that twenty-eight U.S. jurisdictions explicitly permit maintenance and champerty in some form). U.S. jurisdictions have long made exceptions for contingent-fee arrangements. See
id. at 99–100.
242. Michael B. Abramowicz, Litigation Finance and the Problem of Frivolous Litigation, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 195, 196 (2014).
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Similar arguments could be made with respect to private financing for public
litigation. Consider private prosecutions, in which an interested party (often the
victim) pays all or part of the cost of prosecuting the perpetrator, usually by
paying a private attorney to litigate the case in the name of the state, or to assist
state prosecutors.243 Private prosecutions are still permitted in some states244
and the impulse is easy enough to grasp. Prosecutors’ offices often are overburdened and understaffed. Public prosecutors cannot possibly handle all the cases
that come across their desks, and are forced to plead out even serious crimes
because they lack the resources to invest in a full-blown trial. Privatization, so
the argument goes, allows the state to discharge its core duties to victims, and to
the public at large.245
Those who defend states’ reliance on contingent-fee lawyers offer similar
arguments. In a world of limited state budgets, there will be “‘industries that
will not be taken on, . . . cases that will not be brought, unless we allow
contingency fees.’”246 As one group of contingent-fee attorneys put it, when
defending their $14 million fee for work on behalf of the state of Mississippi,

243. See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 116, at 690–91 (describing several New Jersey cases in which
private prosecutors acted in the name of the state); see id. at 689 n.184, 692–95 (describing state laws
and judicial decisions permitting private attorneys to assist in prosecutions).
244. Most courts to consider the question have held that private prosecutions are constitutionally
permissible as long as public officials retain formal control over the litigation. The Fifth Circuit has
held, for example, that:
There is no per se constitutional prohibition against the use of special prosecutors. However,
the use of special prosecutors raises concerns that the prosecutor’s loyalty to the person who
pays the special prosecutor may override the interests of society in justice and a fair trial for
the accused. We require, therefore, that the district attorney retain control of the prosecution,
the special prosecutor not be guilty of conduct prejudicial to the defendant, and the rights
of the defendant be duly observed.
Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (citing Powers v. Hauck, 399
F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1968)). Other courts have held similarly. See Jordan v. State, 786 So. 2d 987,
1011–12 (Miss. 2001) (rejecting due process challenge to private lawyer’s appointment as special
prosecutor, where “either the District Attorney himself or one of his assistants were present with [the
attorney] during most of the pre-trial hearings and at trial”); State v. Nichols, 481 S.E.2d 118, 122–23
(S.C. 1997) (not unconstitutional for prosecutor to be assisted by three private attorneys hired by
victim’s family where prosecutor “maintained control of the case”); State v. Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783,
786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (statute allowing victim to hire private counsel to assist prosecutor
constitutional where extent of participation is to be determined by prosecutor); Riner v. Commonwealth, 601 S.E.2d 555, 569 (Va. 2004) (requirement that public prosecutor “remain in continuous
control of the case” satisfied; not necessary that private attorney “handle only innocuous witnesses and
evidentiary matters”).
245. See O’Neill, supra note 116, at 661 (“It is widely acknowledged that the state possesses limited
resources to allocate to the criminal justice system. . . . [I]f private resources can be tapped to enforce
criminal statutes, the public at large may benefit as the result of those individual efforts.”); Tim
Valentine, Private Prosecutions, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICE, ADJUDICATION,
AND CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR 226, 226 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992)
(defending private prosecutions on the ground that “[t]he average district attorney’s assistant just has
not the time to give every case the attention it needs before trial”).
246. Daniel J. Capra et al., supra note 22, at 2840–41 (quoting Barbara S. Gillers, remarks at the
Fordham University Law panel on tobacco litigation and attorneys’ fees).
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“no attorney would work for the state if they had to depend on the Legislature
for compensation.”247
Note a common assumption running through all of these arguments: more is
better. Third-party funding is beneficial, we are told, because it facilitates
litigation that would otherwise have been impossible given the resource limitations of the party in interest.
But herein lies the problem. Whether more is better in the litigation context is
a difficult, and often hotly contested, proposition. Indeed, one of the most
common critiques of private litigation is that it produces too much litigation.248
From that perspective, government enforcers making do with limited budgets is
a feature, not a bug. Limited resources set a ceiling on how much, in total,
government litigation can do.249 That is a blunt tool for combating excessive
litigation, but it has long been considered a critical difference between public
and private enforcement.250 Supplementing public budgets with private dollars
removes that important check on public litigation. And, unlike traditional user
fees, private financing does not trade a democratic check for a market check.
Recall that a core justification for user fees is that they ration both use and
production of government services. Supplemental payments have the opposite
effect. Because government litigators can access both legislative appropriations
and private dollars, the ratchet moves in only one direction: toward more public
litigation. The potential consequence—too much of a government service—runs
counter to the belt-tightening justification for user fees and other private payment mechanisms.
Defenders of private financing might concede this point as a theoretical
matter, but insist that resource limitations are so stark (particularly at the state
and local levels) that the risk of excessive public litigation is negligible in fact.
Even where more government litigation would be desirable, however, it matters
which cases public litigants pursue. As the next section explains, private
financing is unlikely to raise litigation levels indiscriminately. Donations do not
create a rising tide that lifts all boats; they tend to support particular types of
initiatives. The resulting distortions may be worse than any budgeting shortfall.
C. CHECKBOOK JUSTICE

Consider an extreme hypothetical: suppose that resource constraints prevent a
local prosecutor’s office from pursuing more than one out of every ten crimes.
And suppose that, after an influx of new money, the prosecutor is able to boost
enforcement levels significantly. But suppose that the extra enforcement is
247. Payment by Attorney General in MCI Case at Issue, VENTURA CNTY. STAR, June 9, 2011.
248. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
249. See Zeppos, supra note 126, at 182 (“[B]oth the level of salaries for federal attorneys and the
low number of attorneys (given the amount of the legal work handled in the federal government) . . . may reflect strong legislative preferences concerning the level of law enforcement desired by
Congress.”).
250. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 40, at 36–37.
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focused exclusively on middling offenses committed by the prosecutor’s political rivals (or minority groups, religious leaders, public school children, etc.—
the reader may choose her poison). The point is simple: it can rarely be said that
more is better, full stop. The details matter.
As discussed in Parts I and II, government litigators enjoy broad discretion in
determining how to allocate their time and resources, and in most areas our law
is capacious enough to give them a wide range of choices. Private financing—
like private performance—can alter the exercise of that discretion. Private
dollars will tend to push public decision making in a particular direction,
prompting government attorneys to pursue cases that serve the interests of their
donors rather than “those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public
harm the greatest.”251
According to critics, that is precisely what happened in Ventura County,
California, after prosecutors began to accept private funds to pay for certain
initiatives. In 1993, with the blessing of the state attorney general and legislature, District Attorney Michael Bradbury set up a fund to raise money from
local businesses for the prosecution of workers’ compensation fraud. Citing
state and county budget cuts, Bradbury contended that he would be unable to
prosecute fraud cases without private dollars.252
Bradbury quickly raised more than $150,000 in contributions from school
districts, insurance companies, and other business affected by fraudulent claims
of injury. The Ventura County Agricultural Association, for example, donated
$70,000 in seed money to the cause. Bradbury used the funds to set up a special
unit in the District Attorney’s office, and staffed it with a new prosecutor,
investigator, and clerk. Three years in, the new unit had charged nineteen
defendants with insurance fraud. Meanwhile, workers’ compensation claims in
the County decreased—a shift that defenders of the fund attributed to the “mere
presence of the unit.”253 As one Assistant District Attorney put it, “[t]he
deterrent factor is . . . important in fighting this kind of fraud.”254 Donors
echoed the same theme: “‘We paid for the publicity and educational value’ of
the unit,” one explained.255
Critics offered a different assessment. The apparent purpose of criminal
sanctions for workers’ compensation fraud was to punish and deter repeat
offenders who were making fraud a booming business. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, complaints by employers about widespread fraud—most of it
instigated by unscrupulous lawyers and doctors in “medical mills”—led the
legislature to adopt harsher sanctions, including criminal penalties, aimed at

251. Jackson, supra note 172, at 5.
252. Gary Gorman, D.A. Sets Up Funds for Workers’ Fraud Cases, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1993),
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-01-26/local/me-1805_1_comp-fraud.
253. Paul Elias, D.A. Inches Ahead in War on Insurance Fraud, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-02-19/local/me-37743_1_insurance-fraud.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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fraudsters.256 The result was the legislation that served as the basis for the
prosecutions by the Ventura County special fraud unit. Yet critics charged that
the unit focused overwhelmingly on “the little guys”—workers—while ignoring
the fraud mills and turning a blind eye on possible wrongdoing by employers
and insurers.257
Such a system lines up neatly with the interests of the companies footing the
bill. Employers and insurers are likely to welcome any reduction in claims
activity, fraudulent or otherwise. Matters look different from the public perspective, however. The public interest is served by wiping out fraud (and only fraud)
on both sides of the transaction.
Making matters worse, many areas of law are marked by deep and persistent
disagreement over what counts as harm in the first place, and what government
should do about it. Are topless clubs a scourge on society or simply a source of
steamy entertainment?258 Should the state pursue the death penalty for a mother
who kills her two children?259 Are gun manufacturers responsible for injuries
caused by their products?260 Does the federal Affordable Care Act offend
principles of federalism?261 Private financing gives private interests a powerful
lever of influence over the resolution of these and countless other contests
concerning the appropriate focus of government litigation.
Of course, government can choose to take private funds or leave them—but
that choice may be clouded in important ways by the promise of free money.
Government litigators may feel beholden to donors in ways that undermine their
impartiality, making them reluctant to take steps that disserve donors’ interests.262 And if public attorneys do not feel indebted to their private financiers,
they still may experience an indistinct, and perhaps wholly subconscious, pull
toward litigation initiatives that have a ready source of funding. Even if
government employees are formally in control—free to accept or reject funding

256. Ted Rohrlich & Evelyn Larrubia, Public Fraud Unit Favors Those Who Privately Fund It, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/aug/06/news/mn-65499.
257. Elias, supra note 253.
258. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text (describing private financing for prosecutions
targeting topless clubs).
259. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing private financing in the Susan Smith
case).
260. See supra note 187–88 and accompanying text (describing private contingent-fee arrangements
in municipal suits against gun manufacturers).
261. See supra note 119–20 and accompanying text (describing private financing for ACA challenges).
262. Reasoning from this premise, two state courts have held that private financing in criminal cases
makes it increasingly difficult for public prosecutors to exercise their independent professional judgment free of “compromising influences and loyalties.” State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 315–16
(Tenn. 2000); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 321–22 (Cal. 1996). The concern is analogous to the
concern about gifts to government employees and officials. See, e.g., Rifkin, supra note 104, at 250 (“In
addition to the problem of public perception, there is a real advantage gained by the private-sector
individual who has previously . . . given a gift to a public official. . . . It is difficult, if not impossible,
for a public official, including one of complete honesty and integrity, to deny a request for a meeting or
to refuse to take a telephone call from someone . . . from whom a gift was received.”).
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as they see fit—private financing inevitably shifts some measure of power from
the public to the private sphere.
Worse still, private financing empowers a decidedly nonrandom sample of
citizens: those who are willing and able to pay for government litigation. As
such, private financing raises obvious concerns about access to justice, because
citizens’ ability to participate in the market for public litigation is patently
unequal. Government services typically are governed by a norm of equal
provision: “[a]s a matter of legal doctrine, the delivery of a higher level of
service to the wealthy side of town rather than to the poor side of town is
considered an inequity to be remedied, often by judicial intervention.”263 User
fees and other modes of private financing represent a departure from that norm,
as they allow government services to be rationed according to citizens’ relative
wealth and willingness to pay.264 But that, of course, is one of their principal
drawbacks.265
Inequality in the market for governmental legal services is problematic in its
own right, but it also threatens to diminish the relative advantages of public
enforcement. One of those advantages is that the government can pursue claims
that would not be asserted in a system of purely private enforcement. For
example, research suggests that torts committed against poor and elderly victims are under-deterred, because the victims often cannot afford to sue and their
claims are too small to attract the interest of attorneys willing to work on a
contingency basis.266 Public enforcement can, in theory, fill that void.267 And, to
the extent that budget limitations (or mere inattention) prevent government from
vindicating certain interests, we might welcome private donations if we thought
they would push government attorneys toward cases that would otherwise be
ignored. Private financing is unlikely to serve that gap-filling role, however.
Instead, it may tend to duplicate existing means of redress. In many instances,
the private money available for public litigation could instead be used to pursue

263. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1197 (1996).
264. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2617–18 &
nn.283–84 (2005) (explaining that user fees are one of various ways government can “extract[] funds
from a subset of taxpayers in exchange for dedicating the proceeds to those taxpayers’ benefit”).
265. See, e.g., id. at 2619 (“Special assessments convert government from a social and political
community into a kind of business, more responsive to major customers than to a broader community.”). Critics raise similar objections to the federal policy of allowing tax deductions or credits for
charitable donations, thereby subsidizing the charitable causes wealthy donors opt to support. See Mark
P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1405 (1988)
(“Many question the propriety of vesting power to choose what charities get funded in the wealthy
donor class instead of elected officials or democratic majorities.”).
266. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Demographics of Tort Reform, 4 REV. OF
L. & ECON. 591, 592 (2008) (finding that tort reforms have a disproportionate effect on certain
low-income groups).
267. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (explaining that the EEOC tends to focus its
efforts on small employment discrimination cases that “may not be sufficiently lucrative to attract
profit-motivated attorneys”).
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private litigation.268 Shifting those dollars into the governmental sphere not
only decreases the distinctiveness of public litigation; it also raises doubts about
whether outside funding of public litigation adds value to the legal system as a
whole.
Private financing is likely to be duplicative in a second way as well. Rather
than empowering new groups or amplifying new voices, private dollars will
tend to reinforce existing sources of influence. In most cases, the monied
interests that can afford to bankroll public enforcement will be the same
interests that already hold sway in the political process. Insurance companies,
for example, are hardly shrinking violets likely to escape the notice of state
officials. Nor is the plaintiffs’ bar. Just as money can buy enforcement, it can
also pay for campaign contributions and lobbyists. The upshot is that private
financing is likely to benefit the interests of those who need it the least.
Notwithstanding these concerns, one might still insist that private financing is
tolerable—even beneficial—as long as it operates to supplement public funding
for government litigation. Arguably, private financing simply expands the pie,
leaving more (public) resources available for other causes. Even if aspects of
the privately funded “slice” are regrettable, one might think the benefits are
worth the costs.
Maybe so—but it is important to be clear about both the benefits and the
costs. It bears emphasis that private financing may not always expand the
resources available for other public litigation. Most obviously, the human
resources available for government litigation may be finite. If government
employees must do the work that private contributions pay for, they will have
less time to spend on other initiatives. Moreover, we might expect legislatures
to respond to widespread or repeated private donations by cutting appropriations for public litigation in future years.
But even if private financing expanded the total resources available for
government litigation, it would not follow that we should take the deal. There
are fates worse than inadequate funding. In addition to the concerns outlined
above, there is a distinctive harm that follows from letting citizens buy the
public litigation they want. Imagine a criminal prosecution “brought to you by
McDonalds.” The problem is not—or not only—the suggestion that a large
corporation is in a position to influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The problem is the apparent commodification of government litigation.
D. LITIGATION FOR SALE

Just as one might object to treating public parks as sites for the individual
benefit of those who can afford to use them, one might worry about the broader
social consequences of treating public litigation as a customer-service industry.
This objection reaches beyond concerns about inequality and the duplication of

268. See infra Part IV.B.
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advantage. To see why, imagine a more egalitarian example of private financing:
a state official creates a fund for private donations and caps donations at $100.
Such “crowdsourcing” of funds may allow people of limited means to participate in the market for government litigation, ameliorating problems of inequality.269 But even if we assumed (contrary to fact) that all citizens were able to
contribute in equal amounts, we might still object to arrangements that allow
them to buy legal action in the name of the state.
Here too, third-party financing of private litigation offers an illuminating
analogy. Historical prohibitions on maintenance reflected the view that legal
claims should not be “convert[ed] . . . to a commodity to be exploited and
transferred to economic bidders.”270 That view was based in part on consequentialist concerns akin to those explored above—that allowing third-party financing would produce excessive litigation, or would place too much power in the
hands of “wealthy litigants and over-zealous attorneys.”271 But the anticommodification impulse also rested on a harder-to-pin-down sense that treating legal
claims as items to be bought and sold would corrupt them in some way,
leaching away their moral and civic import and rendering them “purely mercenary instruments.”272 On that view, legal claims serve expressive functions,
articulating the relationship between the parties and the rights and obligations
they have to and against each other. Commodification changes the message, or
so the argument goes. What was once a demand for justice by the interested
party becomes a quest for profit by a faceless third-party funder. That transformation may be harmless in isolation, but it could be contagious: As more and more
legal claims become the subjects of market transactions, the legal system as a
whole is degraded.273
Reasonable minds may disagree on the force of the anticommodification
argument as applied to private claims. For example, Michael Abramowicz has
dismissed such concerns on the ground that legal claims for money damages
“are already partially commodified” in the sense that they “are generally already
269. It might raise a different objection, akin to the duplication point above: the causes that will tend
to capture the attention of multiple donors—so that small donations add up to a meaningful total—will
likely already have the attention of government. Cf. Gergen, supra note 265, at 1409 (noting that, when
making decisions about charitable donations, people tend “to commit excessive resources to highly
publicized causes, e.g., the gifts showered on Jessica McClure, the girl rescued from a well in Midland,
Texas”).
270. Sebok, supra note 241, at 68 (quoting MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickles, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333–34
(Va. 1998)).
271. Id. at 93–94.
272. Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 707 (2005). For
a definition of “corruption” as that term is used in debates over commodification, see MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 34 (2012) (“To corrupt a good or
social practice is to degrade it, to treat it according to a lower mode of valuation than is appropriate to
it.”); as applied to politics, see Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341, 382 (2009) (“Broadly put, corruption is the use of public forum to pursue private ends.”).
273. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1913 (1987) (explaining “domino theory” of commodification); Abramowicz, supra note 272, at 707 (discussing Radin’s
domino theory as applied to litigation).
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seen as largely financially motivated.”274 That may be true of private claims, but
it is far from clear that the same conclusions follow when the subject is public
litigation. As Part I detailed, public and private litigation have long been
distinguished by reference to the interests at stake. Public litigation is presumed
not to be financially motivated; it is supposed to vindicate the public interest,
not narrow private interests. Private financing does not fit comfortably in that
conception. It represents a break, a change in the social meaning of public
litigation.
To be sure, private financing is hardly the only means by which citizens may
use money to influence public litigation; campaign contributions and expenditures are obvious additional examples. But unfettered private spending on
campaigns is intensely controversial precisely because of what it portends for
government in the public interest.275 The Supreme Court has held that concerns
about the corrupting influence of money are insufficient in most cases to trump
citizens’ First Amendment right to “participate in democracy through political
contributions.”276 Yet, despite the current Court’s increasingly muscular protection of that interest, it has never recognized an equivalent right to use personal
funds to support specific government initiatives. That is, the right to spend in
service of a government of one’s choosing appears to be limited to the processes
of electing candidates; it does not extend to funding the services that government offers once candidates assume office. Instead, and quite unlike campaign
financing, funding for government services typically reflects principles of collective—rather than individual—control and benefit.277

274. Abramowicz, supra note 272, at 701, 709.
275. For a small sample of the vast literature on campaign financing and its effects on democratic
governance, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO
STOP IT (2011); Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 1385 (2013); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010);
Teachout, supra note 272.
276. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
277. See KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE GOVERNMENT 107 (1997)
(“Taxing districts collectivize the costs of service delivery. Collectivizing districts spread service costs
across all property owners within district boundaries rather than assess individual users for services
actually consumed.” (emphasis in original)). Thus, taxpayers cannot use the First Amendment as a
shield against paying taxes for services they oppose (including services that involve government
speech), nor can they object to taxes on the ground that they will derive no benefit from certain services
being funded. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“‘Compelled support
of government’—even those programs of government one does not approve—is of course perfectly
constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest.”); Reynolds, supra note 19, at 384 (noting the “legal
irrelevancy of the taxpayer’s assertion that he or she will receive no benefit from the service being
funded by taxes”). Of course, the question whether citizens have an affirmative right to make targeted
payments for government services is different from the question whether they can avoid paying general
taxes. But the absence of the latter right suggests the absence of the former. At least at the federal level,
moreover, an individual right to fund particular government programs would run headlong into the
competing constitutional principle of legislative control over government spending. See Stith, supra
note 109, at 1356–60 (describing principles of the public fisc and of appropriations control).
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Again, user fees and the like are exceptions to the rule; such fees explicitly do
link government services to voluntary payments by individual beneficiaries.278
But again, that is one of their principal drawbacks. Critics contend that user fees
and similar funding mechanisms create a “get what you pay for” mentality that
casts government as seller and citizen as consumer.279 So too with litigation
financing. Allowing citizens to buy public litigation sends a signal—to opposing
parties, to courts, to government attorneys, and to the public at large—about the
purposes and priorities of government generally and of government litigation
specifically. Whereas public funding implies public benefit and control, private
funding implies private benefit and control. Private funding suggests that government litigation is no different from private suits, and that similar financial
considerations drive decisions about which of the myriad competing litigation
initiatives government will pursue.
IV. PRIVATIZATION’S PATHOLOGIES
The discussion in Parts II and III reveals a common objection that runs
against both approaches to privatization: private performance and private financing may change public litigation. By imbuing ostensibly public litigation with
private interests and incentives, privatization imports the pathologies of private
litigation into litigation in the name of the government. One consequence of
privatization, then, is that it can skew government litigation away from the
public interest, rendering it public in name only.
As we have seen, however, privatization is not just distorting; it is also
empowering. It allows private actors to influence the conduct and direction of
government litigation, thereby subverting public control over important aspects
of sovereign authority. In that sense, the privatization of public litigation
triggers concerns about democratic governance that are familiar to the broader
debates over privatization. Government litigation calls on public attorneys to
make a series of contestable, value-laden choices, with significant consequences
for law and policy. Ours may be a government of laws and not men, but it is
men (and women) who make the decisions that shape our law and determine its
practical effect. Their decisions represent “fragment[s] of sovereignty,” “instances in which law acknowledges its own limits and confers a kind of
sovereign prerogative on a legal official.”280

278. See Reynolds, supra note 19, at 409 (explaining the traditional requirements for user fees); see
also id. at 397–429 (describing other mechanisms that link government services to payments by
individual beneficiaries).
279. Id. at 376–77; see Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 32 (1998) (arguing that
a consumer-oriented view of government services undermines “values commonly associated with
democracy—notions of equality, of the importance of collective deliberation and compromise, [and] of
the existence of a public interest not reducible to personal economic concerns”).
280. Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and
the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390 (2008).
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Privatization affects the exercise of that power in ways that disrupt the
normal mechanisms of democratic accountability and control. Outsourcing
public litigation to private attorneys extends to them the sovereign prerogative
typically reserved for government employees. As Part II detailed, the choices
private attorneys make about the conduct and goals of government litigation
will be shaped by their own private incentives, and the habits they bring from
private practice. Like outsourcing in other contexts, privatizing the government’s legal work creates a “danger that private actors will exploit their position
in government programs to advance their own financial or partisan interests at
the expense of . . . the public.”281
Private financing is similarly empowering. Private dollars expand the budgets
of public litigators beyond the bounds staked out by legislative appropriations.
The budgeting process can be understood as a lever for democratic control over
executive discretion. Not only does a limited budget place a cap on how much
any government litigator can do, but it also ensures that decisions about the
scope of public litigation are made (at least in part) by the legislature. Unlimited
private donations upset that balance, consolidating power in the executive
branch.
Critics of states’ reliance on contingent-fee attorneys have emphasized similar themes.282 Indeed, some argue that the primary reason states hire private
lawyers on a contingency basis is “to bypass state legislatures.”283 Properly
framed, however, the objection is not about contingent-fee arrangements as
such; it is about any form of private financing that allows public litigators to
supplement their budgets in the absence of legislative approval.284
The objection that private financing aggrandizes executive power at the
legislature’s expense evaporates—as a formal matter, at least—when the legisla-

281. Metzger, supra note 13, at 1372.
282. See Wilkins, supra note 79, at 436–37 (“[M]any . . . critics assert that contingent[-]fee and
other related contracts in this setting undermine fundamental democratic values, either by reducing the
legislatures’ ability to check prosecutorial discretion or by violating the zone of freedom from state
action to which individual defendants are entitled under our democratic form of government.”).
283. Dana, supra note 22, at 319. Some litigants have tried to leverage this objection into a claim
that contingent-fee arrangements between private attorneys and state attorneys general violate the
separation of powers. Most courts have rejected such challenges. See, e.g., State v. Hagerty, 1998 ND
122, ¶ 28, 580 N.W.2d 139, 147–48; Kinder v. Nixon, 2000 WL 684860, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
Alternatively, some courts have deemed them nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230, 1239 (Md. 1998). The Supreme Court of Louisiana reasoned that contingent-fee
arrangements violate the state’s separation of powers for a somewhat different reason. Rather than
focusing on how contingent-fee arrangements increase the capacity of the attorney general’s office, the
court focused on the fact that, in a successful suit, private counsel is paid out of funds that would
otherwise go to the state or its citizens. Meredith v. Ieyoub, 96-1110, p. 6 (La. 9/9/97); 700 So. 2d 478,
481 (“[U]nder the separation of powers doctrine, unless the Attorney General has been expressly
granted the power in the constitution to pay outside counsel contingency fees from state funds, or the
Legislature has enacted such a statute, then he has no such power.”).
284. Cf. Stith, supra note 109, at 1385 (arguing that to allow federal agencies to use private
donations as they see fit “would be to permit private power, subject only to executive discretion, to
influence the contours of government and governmental policy” (footnote omitted)).
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ture has authorized government litigators to accept funds from private sources.285
But the underlying concerns about private power remain. Private financing does
not just remove a legislative check on public litigation; it also may influence the
exercise of executive discretion itself. The critique of contingent-fee arrangements sees government officials as clear-eyed and calculating, devising ways to
augment their authority. That view ignores that private financing may cloud the
judgment of those very officials, making one course of action seem more
attractive and the opposite course less so.
What should be made of all this? As noted, concerns about undermining
public control over sovereign authority are common to debates over privatization in contexts ranging well beyond litigation. They are strongest when the
government privatizes functions that seem uniquely sovereign, such as prisons
or the military. Thus, proponents of privatization sometimes use a so-called
yellow pages test.286 The idea is that government services that have private,
market analogues—that is, services provided by individuals and firms who can
be found in the yellow pages—are prime candidates for privatization.287 If
private actors are already providing the service themselves, it is hard(er) to see
the problems with hybrid arrangements that empower them to act on behalf of
the government.
The yellow pages test may seem to support the privatization of public
litigation, as litigation is by no means unique to government. We have private
litigation too—and lots of it. But while the yellow pages may be full of private
actors providing litigation services, they are not providing the same service as
the government. As Part I detailed, public and private litigation are different in
significant respects. Whereas private litigation is fueled by the self-interest of
private litigants and lawyers, public litigants and lawyers work within institutional structures designed to ensure that government litigation serves the public
interest.
This Part revisits the distinction between public and private litigation. As it
explains, the notion that government litigation is—and should be—different
from private litigation is not just the stuff of academic theory, but is reflected
throughout our law. In various ways, some subtle and others more overt, we
treat public litigation as distinctive, special. Privatization subverts those prac-

285. See supra notes 105–06, 111–12 and accompanying text (providing examples of legislative
authorization). For an argument that such an authorization by Congress may represent an unconstitutional abdication of its power and responsibility to control appropriations, see Stith, supra note 109, at
1384–86. Professor Stith acknowledges that courts are unlikely to enforce the constitutional principles
she identifies, and urges Congress to “subject . . . gift authority to . . . legislative scrutiny and control.”
Id. at 1395.
286. See, e.g., SCLAR, supra note 13, at 29 (describing the test).
287. E.g., H. Brinton Milward, Make or Buy?, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 319, 320 (2006)
(“[A] presumptive case for contracting out exists if you can find at least three firms in the phonebook
offering a service the [government] produces . . . .”) (reviewing E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION IN THE CITY:
SUCCESSES, FAILURES, LESSONS (2005)).
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tices, allowing private attorneys and interest groups to gain the benefit of
preferential treatment typically reserved for government.
A. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION REVISITED

Nowhere is the distinction between public and private litigation more obvious
than in areas where public litigators have exclusive authority. A decision to
grant the government a monopoly on litigation authority rests, quite explicitly,
on the view that public and private litigation are likely to follow different
pathways, and that the public route is preferable to the private. Consider
criminal prosecutions, for example. Recall that the move toward public prosecutions coincided with a shift in our understanding of crime from a wrong against
the victim to a wrong against the public as a whole. As we came to emphasize
the public interest in prosecuting crimes, we began to doubt whether private
decision making would vindicate that interest. Instead, we placed our faith in
public officials who could represent the government itself—and ultimately the
people. In the words of the California Supreme Court:
That body of ‘The People’ includes the defendant and his family and those
who care about him. It also includes the vast majority of citizens who know
nothing about a particular case, but who give over to the prosecutor the
authority to seek a just result in their name.288

Courts not only assume that government litigators will promote the public
interest in criminal prosecutions, they demand it. Writing for the Supreme Court
in Berger v. United States, Justice Sutherland put it this way:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.289

Although the criminal context has been the locus of the sharpest distinctions
between public and private litigation, similar considerations carry over into the
civil sphere. Criminal law is hardly unique in its public purposes; civil penalties
serve similar goals of deterrence and, sometimes, retribution.290 It should come
as no surprise, then, that both state and federal courts have applied the Supreme

288. People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 315 (Cal. 1996).
289. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
290. See Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 853–54 (2012)
(describing the conventional wisdom that government uses civil penalties to deter wrongdoing and
arguing that agencies’ goals are in fact often better understood in terms of retribution).
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Court’s statements in Berger to the government’s civil lawyers as well.291 Nor
should it be surprising that government typically holds a monopoly on litigating
so-called public rights, which implicate interests that all citizens hold in common.292 And, even where it would be easy to imagine private rights of action,
policymakers frequently vest government attorneys with exclusive authority for
certain aspects of civil law enforcement. As in the criminal context, the decision
to disallow private litigation reflects a judgment that the incentives and capacities of private litigants and lawyers are different from those of government, and
less likely to promote the public interest. Justice Powell articulated the typical
concern in his famous dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, where he
bemoaned the prevailing tendency in the federal courts to imply private rights
of action from ambiguous statutes.293 Private interests, Justice Powell argued,
are far more likely to overburden defendants with “expensive, vexatious litigation” than are public processes “under the control of Government officials
whose personal interests are not directly implicated and whose actions are
subject to [legislative] oversight.”294
For better or worse, Justice Powell’s perspective came to command a majority of the Court, and federal courts are now reluctant to imply private rights of
action in the absence of clear evidence of congressional intent. Notably, however, they tend to be far more generous when it comes to recognizing public
rights of action.295 As one court put it, “it is natural . . . to adopt a more
restrictive view” of the judicial remedies available to private enforcers as
291. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 962 F.2d 45,
47 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The Supreme Court was speaking [in Berger] of government prosecutors . . . but
no one, to our knowledge . . . has suggested that the principle does not apply with equal force to the
government’s civil lawyers.”); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980) (citing
Berger in a civil case for the proposition that “administrative prosecutors . . . are also public officials;
they too must serve the public interest”); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 35 (Cal.
2010) (“[I]t is a bedrock principle that a government attorney prosecuting a public action on behalf of
the government must not be motivated solely by a desire to win a case, but instead owes a duty to the
public to ensure that justice will be done.”); Green, supra note 56, at 256 (“Judicial decisions and other
professional writings take the view that, even outside the context of criminal prosecutions, government
litigators have a different role and different ethical responsibilities from lawyers representing private
litigants.”).
292. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 689, 693–704 (2004) (explaining that “[p]ublic rights are those that belong to the body politic”
and describing longstanding “requirements of public control over public rights”). Legislation that
permits private parties to litigate public rights, such as the citizen-suit provisions of many environmental laws, represents a narrow (and controversial) exception to the general rule. See Cross, supra note 76,
at 58–64. Even in those cases, however, government litigation is available as an alternative, and public
officials typically have authority to take over (or even end) private litigation if they wish. See infra
notes 300–01 and accompanying text.
293. 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 747–48 & n.18.
295. See generally Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2014)
(“[A]s the right-remedy principle has declined in private litigation, federal courts have expanded public
remedies.”). For example, courts have been willing to assume that states have authority to enforce
federal statutes when those statutes authorize suit by injured citizens—and sometimes when they do
not. See Lemos, supra note 63, at 711–12 & n.61. And courts have assumed that the federal government
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opposed to the government itself.296 The reason is one that should by now be
familiar: whereas “only a private controversy is at stake” in most private
actions, “the public interest is involved” when government comes to court.297
If pockets of exclusive public litigation authority present obvious instances
where our legal system differentiates between public and private litigation, they
also capture cases in which the costs of privatization are most clear. These are
cases in which policymakers have determined not to open the courthouse to
private interests.298 Privatization upsets that policy judgment, sneaking private
interests through the back door cloaked in the mantle of the government.
The question becomes more complicated in areas where private parties could
pursue equivalent litigation themselves; that is, where public and private actions
exist side by side. If private groups can finance and litigate private suits, what
difference does it make if they devote their efforts to public suits instead?299
Concerns about private influence over public power seem muted here, and the
yellow pages test would seem to weigh more strongly in privatization’s favor.
There is a critical difference, however, between allowing private interests to
pursue litigation on their own behalf and letting them play influential roles in
litigation in the government’s name. Even the most public-spirited private
litigation is still private. It reflects the judgments of private individuals and
organizations whose visions of the public interest can claim no democratic
pedigree. Accordingly, our system rarely (if ever) grants private interests exclusive litigation authority in areas of public concern. Instead, we allow public and
private litigation to complement each other, leveraging the distinct incentives
and capacities of each so as to cover more ground than either private or
governmental actors would reach on their own. The mix is frequently changing
and constantly contested. The important point for present purposes is that—
whatever the optimal balance—our system can reap the benefits of litigation
diversity only to the extent that public and private remain distinct.
In many areas, moreover, public litigants perform a gatekeeping role. As
David Freeman Engstrom has elaborated, state and federal agencies are often
empowered to “evaluate private lawsuits on a case-by-case basis, blocking bad
cases, aiding good ones, and otherwise husbanding private enforcement capacity.”300 For example, DOJ may intervene in and take control over qui tam

has authority to enforce statutes that “create[] a duty in favor of the public at large.” Cannon, 441 U.S.
at 690 n.13 (explaining that private rights of action typically will not be implied in such circumstances).
296. United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc, 427 F. 3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2005).
297. Id.
298. Cf. Robertson v. U.S. ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 273 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from
the dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted) (“The terrifying force of the criminal justice
system may only be brought to bear against an individual by society as a whole, through a prosecution
brought on behalf of the government.”).
299. Cf. Wilkins, supra note 79, at 451 (suggesting that, from the perspective of public control of
litigation, contracts between government and private attorneys are “clearly preferable” to purely private
litigation).
300. Engstrom, supra note 26, at 620.
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actions initiated by private parties; it “may dismiss or settle a qui tam case out
from under a private [party] entirely”; and it may “veto private dismissals or
settlements in cases it has not joined.”301 Such gatekeeping powers allow
agencies to calibrate private litigation at the retail level, supplementing legislative judgments necessarily made at wholesale. Here, too, the arrangement
makes sense only if government decision makers offer different perspectives
than the private litigants they are overseeing. The check dissolves—or is
hopelessly diverted—if government litigation simply mimics private actions.
Government litigation also serves expressive functions that differentiate it
from purely private suits—even when they concern the same subjects. It is
commonplace to observe, for example, that criminal punishment carries with it
a unique stigma. The stigma reflects the distinctive nature of criminal sanctions,
but it also stems from the fact that the state has decided to prosecute this
particular offender. The crime is against the public, suggesting a broader harm
than an offense that victimizes particular individuals. Civil enforcement can
send a similar message. Rhetoric about civil litigation is brimming with derisive
terms for private actions thought to be motivated less by merit than by greed:
“strike suits,” “nuisance suits,” “blackmail settlements,” etc. Skepticism about
private litigation allows defendants to shrug off private suits as the products of
profit-seeking plaintiffs and attorneys. Public actions are harder to dismiss. As
Part III indicated, government litigation is widely presumed to be immune to the
financial motivations that animate much private litigation. Perhaps more importantly, it is driven by clients and attorneys duty-bound to serve the public
interest—to seek justice, not just private satisfaction. The consequence is that
government litigation may carry a certain gravitas that private litigation lacks.
In short, putting the government’s name on a case changes the way it is
perceived by the public, by courts, and maybe even by opponents. And perceptions can matter a great deal in litigation. For example, Nancy Morawetz has
documented (and criticized) the Supreme Court’s tendency to treat unsubstantiated statements of fact made by federal government litigators as “presumptively
trustworthy.”302 Similarly, although scholars have questioned whether courts
ought to give special weight to arguments made by state governments in cases
involving threats to their authority, empirical evidence suggests that the Supreme Court does pay particularly close attention to arguments advanced by
states, perhaps on the view that they offer the best evidence of the states’
institutional and regulatory interests.303

301. Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
302. Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600, 1605 (2013); see also Zeppos, supra note
126, at 188 (“DOJ’s signature on a brief constitutes important information upon which the court relies.
In exchange, of course, the court gives DOJ goodwill.”).
303. See Lemos & Quinn, supra note 12, at 1238–48 (surveying the empirical evidence on the
effects of state amicus briefs); Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Develop-
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More concretely, the notion that public litigation represents the public interest
serves as the backdrop for a set of legal rules and practices that differentiate
between public and private litigation, mostly to the advantage of government.304
Consider a few examples. Where both public and private rights of action are
available, government litigants may find it easier to establish standing. State
governments, in particular, often sue in a representative capacity as parens
patriae, asserting quasi-sovereign interests in the health and well-being of their
citizens.305 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court cited Massachusetts’
“stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests” as reason for “special solicitude” in the standing analysis.306 The representative nature of parens patriae
suits also enables states to leapfrog over standing limitations that may impede
private suits. For instance, whereas the rule of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
makes it difficult for private parties to seek injunctive relief from sporadic
instances of official misconduct,307 courts have permitted states to sue as parens
patriae in equivalent circumstances.308 Because the state represents all of its
citizens, and because those citizens are a diverse group, it will typically have
little trouble establishing that a harm that has occurred in the past will likely
befall some citizens in the future.
To some extent, government’s advantage is shared by other representative
groups. But courts sometimes distinguish between public and private representatives. The multistate tobacco litigation provides an illustration. Courts recognized states’ standing to sue the tobacco companies to recoup the expenses they
had incurred as a result of smoking-related illnesses suffered by their citizens.309 Yet when private organizations (such as unions and health maintenance
organizations) asserted similar claims, courts ruled that their injuries were too
remote to establish standing.310
Representative suits by states also enjoy a raft of other procedural advantages
over their private analogs—class actions. Whereas private class actions are
governed by a complex set of procedural requirements designed to promote
judicial economy and protect the interests of absent class members, similar suits
by states and the federal government are largely free from procedural constraint.
ment of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 389–404 (2012) (proposing a taxonomy to guide
Justices’ decisions on whether to give special weight to state amicus briefs in federalism cases).
304. Cf. Zeppos, supra note 126, at 184–86 (discussing administrative-law doctrines that favor
government defendants (deference doctrines, exhaustion requirements, etc.) and suggesting that such
“rules operate as a kind of subsidy”).
305. See Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847 (2000).
306. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
307. 461 U.S. 95, 96–98 (1983) (holding that plaintiff who had been subjected to a police
choke-hold lacked standing to seek an injunction because he could not establish an immediate threat
that he would face the same conduct again).
308. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that state had
standing to sue as parens patriae to enjoin police misconduct while noting that “many individual
victims may be unable to show the likelihood of future violations of their rights”).
309. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 241–42.
310. See id.
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For example, state litigators need not show that the state’s claims are typical of
those of its citizens, that common issues of law and fact predominate over
issues unique to individual citizens, or that the litigators themselves will adequately represent the interests of the state’s citizens.311 Nor must states provide
notice, or an opportunity to opt out, to citizens whose interests might be affected
by the outcome of the case.312 State actions are also exempt from the jurisdictional machinations of the recent Class Action Fairness Act.313 As a result,
representative suits by states can proceed in instances where private actions
would founder at the class-certification stage.314 And even if a private class
action were possible, the state’s case may be significantly cheaper because the
state need not sign up clients, provide notice to interested citizens, or litigate the
certification question.315
Government litigators likewise can avoid mandatory arbitration clauses that
would doom private actions, even when government is seeking relief “specific
to a victim who agreed to arbitrate claims.”316 The cases rest in part on formal
distinctions between public and private parties: although the victim may have
agreed to arbitration, the government did not.317 But the cases also reflect the
broader view that government “may be seeking to vindicate a public interest,
not simply provide make-whole relief for the [victim], even when it pursues
entirely victim-specific relief.”318
The special procedural treatment for government suits is not mere happenstance; in many cases it is grounded quite explicitly in a presumption that
government litigators are different from—and more trustworthy than—their
counterparts in the private bar. That perception is on full display in instances
where courts have been faced with dueling public and private aggregate actions,
and have denied certification to the private class action on the ground that the
state suit is a superior method of adjudication. As one court explained, “the

311. Lemos, supra note 26, at 502–07 (describing differences between the rules for private class
actions and those governing representative actions by states).
312. See id. at 507–08.
313. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 739 (2014); cf. People ex rel.
Cuomo v. Greenberg, 946 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7 (App. Div. 2012) (holding that suit by state attorney general
was exempt from similar jurisdictional rules governing private securities actions).
314. See Lemos, supra note 26, at 505.
315. Erichson, supra note 131, at 142 (“Government entity clients present a perfect opportunity for
plaintiffs’ lawyers to achieve the effect of aggregation without the need for class action or any other
judicial joinder and without the need for signing up numerous clients.”).
316. Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 843 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Iowa 2014).
317. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); Rent-A-Center, 843 N.W.2d at
741.
318. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 296; accord People v. Coventry First LLC, 915 N.E.2d 616, 619
(N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he government agency may seek relief specific to a victim who agreed to arbitrate
claims, because . . . that relief is best understood as part of the vindication of a public interest . . . .”);
see also Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 958 N.E.2d 1203, 1211 (Ohio 2011) (reasoning that “the
characteristics of the [state insurance commissioner’s] public-protection role confirm that she does not
stand in the shoes of the insolvent insurer” for purposes of arbitration).
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State should be the preferred representative” of its citizens.319 Thus, whereas
courts take pains to ensure that private counsel adequately represent the interests of absent class members, they are willing to assume that state litigators are
adequate representatives.320 “Proceedings by the state,” another court observed,
“are presumably taken with the best interests of state residents in mind.”321
The list could go on, but the point should be clear. Our legal system reflects
our belief that government litigation serves different interests, and promotes
different goals, than litigation by private parties and attorneys. And, for the most
part, it gives government suits an edge over analogous private actions.
All of this helps to explain why private actors might prefer to support
government litigation rather than focusing their efforts on private suits. It also
clarifies why privatization matters—and should be cause for concern—even
where public and private actions proceed in parallel. Unlike scenarios in which
private actors are authorized to pursue litigation that mimics action by the
government, privatization allows private interests to influence litigation in the
name of the government itself. As such, privatization extends to private actors
certain advantages that are grounded in presumed differences between public
and private litigation. But while it empowers private interests, privatization
simultaneously weakens government litigation, both in the short term—by
diminishing its distinctive features—and in the long term. By blurring the lines
between public and private litigation, privatization undermines the justifications
for treating government litigation differently. Most of the rules described above
are judicially created, and they could change if courts’ faith in the distinctiveness of public litigation were to falter. The stronger the resemblance between
public and private actions, the harder it becomes to defend preferential treatment for government.
B. CORRALLING PRIVATIZATION

I have argued that the government’s reliance on private attorneys and private
financing gives private interests undue influence over public litigation, raising
concerns about democratic authority and accountability, and about the way we
perceive and manage the relationship between public and private litigation.
Those objections counsel against a headlong rush to privatization, even where
the benefits seem most clear. It need not follow, however, that government must
wean itself off private resources entirely. As Part II explained, with sufficient
care at the front end and sufficient oversight throughout the contract arrangement, it may be possible for government to reap the benefits of private performance without sacrificing public control over the conduct of litigation. Again, it

319. Sage v. Appalachian Oil Co., Nos. 3:92-CV-176, 2:93-CV-229, 1994 WL 637443, at *2 (E.D.
Tenn. Sept. 7, 1994).
320. Lemos, supra note 26, at 502–04.
321. Thornton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 1:06-cv-00018, 2006 WL 3359482, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 17, 2006).
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bears heavy emphasis that such oversight goes beyond the formal reservation of
authority typically required by law; it entails ongoing guidance and supervision
to ensure that government employees maintain functional control of litigation,
and that important decisions reflect public rather than private values.322 In many
cases—perhaps most—the requisite oversight will render outsourcing more
expensive than the in-house alternative. But it is, at least, theoretically possible.
The problems with private financing are harder to avoid, so long as contributions are targeted to particular litigation initiatives. Greater transparency would
be a step in the right direction, but it would not remove the risk that government
priorities will be skewed by private influence. Anonymity would also help, as it
would decrease the likelihood that government officials will prioritize the
interests of wealthy donors, whether out of a sense of obligation or a desire to
secure further donations. But even anonymous payments—if earmarked—have
the potential to deflect public litigation toward the cases that private donors
deem important rather than those that serve the public interest. The best
(perhaps the only) way to avoid that risk is to require all funds for government
litigation to be paid into the general treasury, so that decisions about how they
are allocated and ultimately spent are made by government officials according
to the usual processes for appropriations. At the very least, gifts should be both
anonymous and earmarked only to the extent that they are designated for legal
work, not for any particular litigation efforts.
Concededly, a prohibition on earmarks for public litigation would be a bitter
pill. First, it would effectively rule out most contingent-fee arrangements. Such
arrangements might be instigated by the government or by the attorney, but it is
difficult to imagine them being struck in the abstract. From the attorney’s
perspective, the reasonableness of the deal depends on the details of the case in
question—the expected costs of litigation and the probability, and likely size, of
a recovery. Remove the target and the deal no longer makes sense.
Second, targeted giving may be significantly more attractive to would-be
donors than the alternative of a blank check to the general treasury, or even to
legal work more generally. Research on taxation and charitable giving suggests
that people are more willing to engage in philanthropic giving when they can
earmark the funds.323 We might get much less giving, then, if we do not allow
donors to support public litigation in a targeted manner.

322. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 13, at 291, 307 (advocating “the development of a due
process-based duty to supervise, under which the government must actively oversee decision making
by its private delegates, at least when that decision making directly affects third parties”).
323. Sherry Xin Li et al., Directed Giving Enhances Voluntary Giving to Government, 133 ECON.
LETTERS 51, 51 (2015) (reporting that subjects were more than twice as likely to contribute to charitable
causes, including those performed by government, when voluntary donations could be earmarked for
specific purposes); Sherry Xin Li et al., Giving to Government: Voluntary Taxation in the Lab, 95 J.
PUB. ECON. 1190, 1191 (2011) (concluding that “the antipathy often expressed toward taxation is due
more to coercion or lack of control over the use of resources, rather than to government per se, and that
taxpayers embrace the voluntary, earmarked feature of a gift to a specific government agency”).
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Third, there will undoubtedly be cases in which government litigation will be
thwarted if executive-branch attorneys have to rely on the legislature for
funding, particularly in times of divided government. For example, several state
attorneys general used contingent-fee arrangements with private attorneys to
support their suits against the tobacco industry after their funding requests were
rebuffed by the legislature (and, in at least one case, by the governor).324
Without private financing, those suits might not have been possible. As one
defender put it:
After nearly forty years of political and legal inactivity, the attorney general
litigation represents the first significant progress in holding manufacturers
accountable (financially and otherwise) for the undisclosed and undertested
hazards of cigarettes. To conclude that the attorney general litigation is on
balance a bad thing, then, one also has to accept the fact that without it
manufacturers may very well have remained largely unaccountable for the
undisclosed hazards of cigarettes.325

It is important not to overstate this point, and tobacco litigation at the federal
level offers a useful counterexample. Shortly after DOJ initiated its own landmark case against the tobacco companies, Congress denied Attorney General
Janet Reno’s special appropriation request of $20 million to finance the preparations.326 After a year of scraping by, Reno appealed to the public.327 “Without
that money, we will not be able to proceed,” she told reporters, “[a]nd I think it
is imperative that we move forward to protect the American people and to give
them their day in court.”328 In the face of multiplying news reports, Congress
caved.
Although the federal example serves as a reminder that appropriation battles
can in fact be won, there is no denying that private financing will sometimes
make the difference between litigation success and failure. If nothing else,
targeted private donations shift the burden of inertia. Whereas the normal
appropriations process requires the legislature to rouse itself to authorize funds,
private money allows litigation to proceed unless the legislature takes steps to

324. See Phil Brinkman, Legal Bill Won’t Affect State Much Although the Contract Was with the
State, the Issue Is Really Between the Lawyers and the Tobacco Industry, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 21, 1999, at
A1 (reporting that the attorney general defended hiring a contingent-fee lawyer on the ground that
“there was little enthusiasm among legislators to spend state money on a lawsuit that some felt
shouldn’t have been brought and others felt couldn’t be won,” and the governor had refused a funding
request for additional government employees to work on the litigation).
325. Wendy E. Wagner, Rough Justice and the Attorney General Litigation, 33 GA. L. REV. 935, 961
(1999) (footnote omitted).
326. EUBANKS & GLANTZ, supra note 131, at 28.
327. Id. at 32.
328. Michael J. Sniffen, Reno Asks for Help with Tobacco Suit, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2000,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20001005/aponline121207_000.htm.
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block it.329 In today’s world of hyperpolarized parties and legislative gridlock,
the difference between action and inaction will often be critical. Restricting
private financing will mean reining in government litigators.
Unappealing as it may seem in particular policy contexts, this is our democracy at work. We will not always like the results. It is easy to conjure examples
of valuable government litigation that was made possible only by targeted
private payments. But it pays to remember that valuable is in the eye of the
beholder. Unless one is willing to embrace all instances of private financing,
from groups across the ideological spectrum, the defense is hard to sustain on
principled grounds.
Some readers will still conclude that privatization, warts and all, is preferable
to the alternative. Privatization is particularly attractive in areas where equivalent private actions are unavailable or likely to be unavailing. To see why, recall
the defense of contingent-fee arrangements that we considered in Part III: There
will be “industries that will not be taken on, . . . cases that will not be brought,
unless we allow [targeted private financing].”330 That is not quite accurate, of
course. Rather, there are cases that will not be brought by the government. In
many areas, public and private rights of action exist side by side, and private
attorneys and financiers remain free to throw their resources behind actions on
behalf of private interests. We should call those cases what they are—private
suits—rather than disguising them as government actions.
Yet—and here we confront the real rub—in some instances disallowing privatization will indeed preclude all actions, both public and private because private suits are
not a viable option. As the previous section described, private parties may not have
authority to sue, or they may face legal barriers that government could have avoided.
Here privatization offers a tempting second-best alternative.331
If anything, the relative advantages of government litigation—and, thus, of
privatization—have increased in recent years. Although government suits have
long enjoyed an edge over purely private actions, the gap has widened as

329. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 251 (“Even if the legislature is circumvented by the use of
contingency fees, it is not disabled. It can still act to block the . . . litigation. The critical difference
involves on whom the risk of impasse falls.”). Professor Coffee prefers to place the risk of impasse on
those opposing litigation, but his focus is on a particular kind of case: securities class actions, most of
which are undertaken by state pension funds with the assistance of contingent-fee attorneys. As he
points out, the question in that context is not whether a lawsuit will be filed, but who will control
it—the state, or a different lead plaintiff. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 249. Professor Coffee
acknowledges that the concern that “the volume of class litigation in the United States will be inflated
by political contributions (i.e., suits that would otherwise not be brought will be brought) . . . may be
more valid” in other contexts, such as mass tort or consumer class actions. Id.
330. See Wilkins, supra note 79, at 433, and accompanying text.
331. Litigation privatization could thus be understood as a variant of what Jon Michaels has called
privatization “workarounds.” See generally Michaels, supra note 202 (arguing that government may
use privatization to substantively alter the policies being administered, often in a way that circumvents
limitations on government action). In the litigation context, by contrast, government and private actors
are using privatization not only to expand the capacity of government, but also to circumvent
limitations on private action.
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private litigation has become the target of mounting hostility.332 Courts and
policymakers have channeled that hostility by erecting new obstacles to private
suits and shoring up old ones.333 Controversial as they are, those obstacles show
no signs of imminent erosion. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that privatization
seems to have become more prevalent during the same period. Privatization
offers a way around the barriers to private litigation, allowing private interests
to have their day in court under the guise of government.
Understanding privatization as a work-around helps explain its allure, but it
also highlights the risks of the strategy. Government litigation is a viable
alternative only because—to date—it has escaped most of the enmity that has
been directed at private litigation. Instead, our legal system continues to presume that public and private litigation are meaningfully different. As we saw
above, however, widespread privatization may precipitate a shift in how other
actors in the legal system view government litigation. In so doing, it may spell
the end of various legal rules and practices that prioritize public litigation over
private lawsuits. In other words, while privatization may seem to offer private
interests an opportunity to accomplish more with litigation, in the long run it
may leave us with less. And that pill would be bitter indeed.
CONCLUSION
Privatization is touted as a way to improve the efficiency of government
services. Yet privatizing the government’s legal work may have the opposite
effect. Contracting with private lawyers may be more expensive than keeping
the work in-house, and private financing may encourage excessive, duplicative
government litigation. Neither consequence is inevitable, to be sure. Outsourcing will often be the most cost-effective option in cases involving novel or
particularly complex legal issues. And private donations may be valuable
curatives in circumstances where resource limitations have resulted in a serious
undersupply of government litigation.
Even where the advantages of privatization are most pronounced, however,
significant costs remain. Private performance and private financing may change
public litigation, remaking it in the private image. Private lawyers and donors
inject private interests and incentives into government litigation, shifting both
the ends sought and the means used to pursue them. As such, privatization saps
government litigation of its distinctive potential, leaving it public in name but
increasingly private in essence. If privatization becomes more widespread, the
line dividing public and private litigation will become difficult to sustain—and
so too will the justification for treating government differently.

332. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties
and the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752 (2013) (tracing the complicated
political dynamics behind contemporary battles over private litigation).
333. See generally Burbank & Farhang, supra note 73 (describing efforts by Congress, courts, and
rule makers to restrict private litigation).

